By Toendepi Shonhe
Given the history of a parked transition since 1980, Zimbabweans are worried that the country remains arrested by retrogression. Zimbabwe has been stagnant without tangible development and the future of the country is threatened by misgovernance, corruption, lack of leadership and a complete absence of a shared vision. The country’s prospects are dim.
Indeed, the country is in deep crises that require Zimbabweans to reflect deeply as a collective. The important questions to be asked are: why must we be worried; what is at stake and what are the prospects for Zimbabwe?
Contemporary public discourse presupposes that there are two variables that are important in determining what direction the country may take towards 2018 and beyond; namely, the prospects of a strong coalition and electoral reforms and that the two are mutually exclusive.
The truth of the matter is that while these two factors are critical, there are other equally important factors to consider when trying to imagine what sort of strategies the opposition in Zimbabwe may assume going into 2018. This article provides an opportunity to technically appraise these complex electoral questions and the prospects for the opposition.
Key factors for scenario mapping
As already indicated, beyond coalitions and electoral reforms, the other factors to be considered are; the economy, regional and international support, legitimacy, leadership, funding, trust and confidence.
The economy
A further deterioration of the economy will result in increased dissatisfaction by the citizens. In any case, unemployment and the economic crises remain the major concern by citizens across the length and breadth of the country, as the May 2017 Afrobarometer survey results have shown.
The high prevalence of poverty in both urban and rural areas, among the young and women is a key factor for the citizens. Against limited scope for reversal of the downward trend in the economy, given the unlikelihood of increasing foreign direct investment (FDI), slowed down impact of the import substitution policy implemented through Statutory Instrument (SI) 64 and limited value-addition on minerals and agricultural commodities, the chances of stabilising the currency remains sketchy.
However, cognisance must be taken of possibilities of food security gained in the 2016/17 farming season and its potential to minimise the levels of disenchantment. Food sovereignty will have the effect of reducing the demand for foreign currency and as such may help stabilise the currency. If this was to trigger production in the industry, this may begin to reverse de-industrialisation; however, this looks most unlikely as most products are exported in raw form due to the disarticulated nature of the economy. In the absence of fundamental changes in industrial production, little must be expected to revamp the economy .
Interestingly, apportioning blame and giving accolades by citizens has not matched conventional knowledge, as Afrobarometer revealed.
On the other hand, Zanu PF has sought to proffer a new narrative based on an emerging new economy where the informality of the economy is normalised. This has been aided by a highly reconfigured political economy where the social base has undergone comprehensive changes. How the ruling party will consolidate its narrative and/or how the opposition will develop and indulge with a counter-narrative matters in terms of how citizens will weigh the impact of the economy going forward.
Regional and international support
To achieve the desired electoral and democratic reforms, Zimbabwe needs regional and international support.
In 2013, an opportunity was lost where Sadc and the African Union (AU) had sided with the citizens’ quest for democratic elections, yet the opposition disregarded the advice, thereby squandering a grand opportunity for reforms. This resulted in Zimbabwe regressing in a very significant way.
Restarting the formula will require a new impetus, which is currently non-existent among the key players in the polity. This is made worse by the fact that the major international centres of power, including the country’s former colonial masters (Britain), the United States and European Union have begun to thaw relations with some elements within Zanu PF, never mind its effect on democracy in the country.
The overall impact is that regional and international support for reforms will be more difficult to mount given that these players are now more focussed on advancing their economic interests more settling the long-standing democratic deficiency, for which the opposition movement has long cherished.
On its part, the ruling party has relied on the former liberation movements’ platform for collaboration and solidarity. This is likely to increase given the threat being posed to the African National Congress (ANC) by its own opposition, now including the core-alliance partners, Congress of South African Trade Unions and South African Communist Party.
However, President Robert Mugabe’s age may begin to cause an overall decline in regional support for the ruling party. In the event of Mugabe’s untimely departure, any successor will struggle to amass the same level of support in Africa, diminishing the country’s role in shaping the agenda in Sadc and AU. How these possible futures may shape scenarios for 2018 and beyond depends much more on how either side will shape regional and international advocacy.
Legitimacy
The post-2008 elections negotiations that led to the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) revealed that Zanu PF has a strong affinity for some form of electoral legitimacy despite its authoritarian tactics. This may be the only leverage that the opposition may have to rely on to push for reforms and the holding of free and fair elections. How the opposition movement will explore and use this important factor and how Zanu PF will respond may have material impact on the quality of the election to be held in 2018?
Alternatively, it will be a question of how Zanu PF ensures that it secures legitimacy in spite of the party’s refusal to implement electoral reforms. These questions will determine how Zimbabwe’s future may be shaped going into 2018 and beyond.
Leadership
A key factor that will influence likely scenarios for 2018 is leadership. With regards to Zanu PF, providing leadership in the various aspects of the governance sphere has been problematic and questionable.
In the end, the ruling party has had to rely on strong-hand tactics to maintain its grip on power. The party has had to resort to both coercion and consent to secure power retention. However, Mugabe’s advanced age, at 94 when the next election will be held, has intensified the succession battle within the ruling party.
Two main factions (Lacoste and G40) have recently emerged. There has been intensive infighting that initially resulted in the expulsion of former vice-president Joice Mujuru and her sympathisers and, more recently, the expulsion of some members of both Lacoste and G40 factions.
What may save the ruling party is its strong reliance on the security apparatus for electoral campaigns. For instance, its continued presence in the villages under Maguta, the securitisation of unemployed youth residing in the villages, the politicisation of food distribution, the politicisation of artisanal mining and vending spaces, all work in its favour.
As such, in spite of the weaknesses associated with its aged leadership and the attendant intensification of succession fights, Zanu PF’s octopus nature and its convoluted party-state configuration may propel its fighting chances come 2018.
The opposition is currently fragmented. There are more than 40 political parties, even though some of them have been described as briefcase parties. Currently, there are various initiatives aimed at building a coalition to increase the potency of the opposition movement in the 2018 elections.
However, the issue of leadership structure remains unclear. As a result, Zimbabweans continue to doubt the effectiveness of the proposed coalition. In part, the problems hover around the ability of the leadership to set aside personal interests, egos and parochial party agendas, and push for a common people’s agenda.
In addition, Zimbabweans worry about the ability of the collective leadership to build trust and confidence among the voters, given incessant fights over control, policy, strategies and leadership credentials. How these and other issues will be resolved is of material importance as 2018 beckons. In any event, past inadequacies associated with failure to assume state power after electoral victories will require additional effort by opposition leaders if the dormant vote is to be triggered into voting.
Funding
Funding is an important component for any election. On the part of Zanu PF, there has been a huge inflow of resources in the form of vehicles: buses, trucks and sedan cars as well as fuel and regalia. This funding is tied to some patronage setting where international capital has been given lucrative deals by the government in the mining and fuel industry in return for funding the power retention agenda.
Moreover, the party is relying on the printing of bonds and artificial money transfers for the purchase of hard currency that is, in turn, used to purchase electoral campaign arsenal.
The stage is set for a highly competitive race towards 2018. To the contrary, the opposition movement is underfunded and this is likely to negatively impact on its ability to mobilise and recruit new members. Similarly, the monitoring of the election will also be compromised.
Civil society is generally resource poor due to donor fatigue and change of policy, wherein the thawing of relations with the ruling party has created the need for either genuine neutrality or outright support for some preferred successor. In some cases, specific funds have been set aside by some donors to propel some candidates in Zanu PF. How this will be sustained or curtailed will define the trajectory for 2018 and beyond.
The narrative
An authotarian regime relies on ideological positioning around a revolutionary project or some historical legacy to awaken emotions among the voting citizens. As a result, a highly contested area has been around party ideology, policy and strategies.
Some analysts have argued that Zanu PF has no clearly defined ideology and therefore it is not easy to place its orientation. Yet, despite its capitalist tendencies, policy pronouncements have almost always been populist, redistributive and left-leaning in nature. The land reform and indigenisation and empowerment programmes are cases in point.
Meanwhile, the opposition has shown no clear ideology that speaks to the improvement of livelihood questions of citizens in general. If this is to change, clear policy formulation processes must be implemented and this must be supported by messages to counter the dominant messages by the ruling Zanu PF.
The two driving forces
In identifying the coalition and electoral reforms as key variables for 2018 among the other factors articulated in this piece, the opposition correctly captures the key driving forces for the next election. However, it is the nature of the coalition and the extent of the electoral reforms which may be central to the likely outcome for 2018.
Coalition
The issue is not about coming up with one coalition for the opposition movement, but it is about the nature, structure, strength and potential to deliver a victory in 2018. To achieve this, the coalition must have a people’s agenda, reconcile ideological differences, establish a winning team, ensure leadership cohesion, develop a superior message and secure adequate funding. Its post-election agenda and structure must be clearly defined, taking into account a possible win or lose in 2018.
The coalition must gain the trust and confidence of the people and must eliminate individual weaknesses of the team members by assembling a team with differentiated capacities. Overtime, the possibility to achieve these goals is high. However, it will require sacrifices on the part of the variegated leaders from the parties involved, a feat that may prove insurmountable. Moreover, intra-party friction may likely balloon as power dynamics shift in response to coalition reconfigurations.
On the surface, a coalition that combines groupings from the democratic contingent and the National People’s Party (NPP) leader Joice Mujuru grouping may provide the much-needed gravitas to deliver victory given the combined elements of democratic values and liberation credentials by the opposition. The liberation parties are most likely to have created a solid network within the region where solidarity and electoral support is provided on the basis of a shared history of anti-colonial struggles in Southern Africa.
To unravel this setting, liberation icons such as those in the Zimbabwe People First (ZimPF) and NPP are a crucial component. However, the challenge remains in unsettled historical questions, where their past atrocities continue to be a burden which dissuade ordinary citizens from supporting these formations and may work against the interests of the coalition.
It is also crucial to note that the total support for the coalition remains below that of Zanu PF, at 32% and 38% respectively. In addition, support for Zanu PF is way above the combined individual party support of 22%; being 16% for the MDC-T, 4% for NPP and 2% for the rest of the parties. How these parties in their individual and collective settings will reconfigure their fortunes is entirely the big question as we progress into the 2018 elections.
Electoral reforms
The electoral reform agenda predates the 2013 elections. Whereas the new constitution provides for electoral reforms, media reforms and many other freedoms, its implementation remains a key concern, as citizens are yet to enjoy these freedoms. Again, whereas the opposition movement has mounted various campaigns to push for electoral reforms, such efforts are yet to achieve any meaningful progress.
For instance, the National Electoral Reform Agenda (Nera) platform started with zest and gusto, but this has since fizzled out. Current coalition discussions have not been specific in terms of how the issue of reforms will be treated or prioritised, as current efforts seem to be centred on establishing a workable framework rather than developing the agenda for the envisaged government.
On its part, the Zanu PF government has never willingly entertained the constitution-making process. The ruling party resisted the constitution-making process since the early 1990s as part of its power retention agenda, but had to grudgingly accede to the demands of a highly-mobilised and powerful opposition and civil society. The Government of National Unity (GNU) and 2013 constitution became the climax of the opposition and civil society in Zimbabwe.
Despite its expansive consultation and public deliberation, the constitution-making process become elitist, non-deliberative and served more as a political settlement rather than fulfilling the interests of the citizens. In addition, the ruling party is unwilling to implement the new constitution as well as the attendant reforms, for fear of losing power. It is on this basis that, the prospects for reform seem unlikely. This may have a large bearing on the prospects of the opposition in 2018.
The introduction of the biometric voter registration (BVR), although advocated for by the opposition, has resulted in a murkier situation given the possible machinations that may disenfranchise the majority of the opposition supporters. Put together with the polling station-based voting, the opposition support will likely suffer from intensified fear and thus accelerate Zanu PF victory.
Countenancing the scenarios
Scenario I: Paradise: The paradise scenario will achieve full democratic reforms that will promote sustainable elections for Zimbabwe. It is most highly unlikely, but the best-case scenario for Zimbabwe. Within this scenario, all the outstanding reforms identified by Crisis Coalition as early as 2003 and recently restated by Dr Ibbo Mandaza and Tony Reeler will be resolved before the next election. These are:
The judiciary has been politicised and subordinated to the executive;
The bi-partisan parliament still functions as a rubber-stamp of the executive’s whims and policies;
The army, police and intelligence are clearly partisan and have played a key role in serious human rights violations;
Traditional leaders have been co-opted into ruling party structures and psyche;
Senior civil servants have been manipulated to serve as handmaids of the system;
Religious leadership has identified itself with Zanu PF policies and positions and has failed to exercise its prophetic and guardianship role in the nation. Where the leadership has dared to differ, it has been met with scorn from the highest office in the land;
Black business is largely an extension of Zanu PF’s primitive accumulation tendencies in as much as white business was the sanitised face of Rhodesian fascism;
Militarisation of sections of unemployed youths under the guise of the National Youth Service programme; and
The public electronic and print media is used as propaganda machinery for the ruling party.
Mandaza and Reeler (2016) observe that to level the electoral playing field, the opposition movement must demand the following as minimum conditions for the next elections:
Demand that all service chiefs make a public statement to the effect that they will obey the constitution and their enabling legislation, and will not support any individual political party (as the constitution requires).
Furthermore, they will disband Joc (Joint Operations Command), and only engage the government through the channel of the National Security Council (NSC) (as the constitution requires). Additionally, the government will invite the leader of the opposition to sit on the NSC as a confidence-building measure, since Zimbabwe is not in a state of war;
Demand that the Council of Chiefs make a public statement that they too will obey the constitution and their enabling legislation, and will not support any individual political party;
Demand that the state radio and television are de-politicised through the institution of a new management board, and that this board is constituted of independent persons without political affiliation;
Demand that all the powers under the constitution are accorded to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec), and no government minister can have any say over any aspect of elections; and
Demand that the Electoral Act is amended in order to allow proportional representation and hence the diaspora vote.
In addition, in this scenario, all opposition political parties will be included in a grand coalition and respectful relationships will be developed. Issues of leadership, funding, messaging will be dealt with to ignite new energy in the opposition movement. A strong and attractive alternative policy framework will be developed to reverse the negative effects of the current mis-governance. Prudent leadership in economic affairs will require taking tough decisions on the economy.
In this scenario, the opposition has the brightest chances of performing well. However, voters seem to be struggling with unanswered questions around the leadership structure and the shared agenda of the coalition. Addressing these and creating the necessary cohesion among the leadership may result in increased combined support from the 32% observed by the Afrobarometer/MPOI survey to some higher figure given that at least 24% of the population did not say they sympathise with the ruling party in categorical terms. Citizens are likely to have a new impetus to vote if they are assured of a reformed electoral environment and a solid coalition.
Scenario II: Paradox: This is a paradox scenario in that it presupposes the attainment of reforms in the absence of a coalition. This is difficult to conceive because the reforms can more surely be achieved by a coalition of the opposition than it is by a fragmented opposition. This may be achieved if one of the political parties or all the political parties are successful in working on an electoral reform agenda but fail to agree on an electoral coalition arrangement.
However, is inconceivable that parties agreeing on an electoral reform agenda working arrangement, will fail to agree on a coalition pact on the same breath. As such, this scenario is unlikely but it is also a good scenario with prospects for the deepening of democracy in Zimbabwe.
If this scenario were to prevail, it will create the most ideal environment for democracy to flourish, because the situation will allow for multiparty democracy where various parties participate and compete on the basis of their policies and leadership qualities. This is a far superior proposal in that the agenda is not confined to the removal of a leader or a political party, instead; the proposal becomes one that is centred on delivering good governance and ensuring that citizens can pursue happiness.
However, such a scenario may not deliver regime change, as the ruling party may remain in power. If there is no drastic change in policy by the ruling party, this may mean a sustained economic collapse for the foreseeable future.
Scenario III: The dead-end: In the likely situation where electoral reforms are not in place and a coalition fails to materialise, the 2018 elections provide a clear platform for a dead-end.
Zanu PF will achieve a landslide victory over the fragmented opposition; however, each party will secure a chance to fight on another day. Those parties that will manage to win some seats will be able to secure state funding and live to fight from a point of strength in future elections.
The prospects for economic revival under this scenario are very dim. The question of legitimacy may be the only strategic fallback for the opposition after the defeat; however, this depends on how regional and international support will be mobilised and how Zanu PF will respond to the opposition advocacy programmes. This scenario will be made worse by failure to effectively fundraise for the election by the fragmented opposition and sustained donor fatigue.
Moreover, going into the election as a fragmented opposition diminishes the chances to a level where a resounding Zanu PF victory will impact on prospects for opposition revamp in immediate future elections. This is likely, but is also the worst-case scenario for the opposition movement in Zimbabwe.
Scenario IV: Collective calamity: A Coalition secured in the absence of reforms is most likely to deliver a fatal blow to democratic transition in Zimbabwe. The level of electoral faults is so high that if a coalition was to be achieved and used to contest under the existing skewed electoral environment, a collective defeat attained will take decades to reverse.
While the current efforts by the opposition is on trying to secure a workable coalition, its possible failure to secure reforms may pose the biggest danger to democracy for years to come. This scenario is somewhat likely but is similarly bad for the opposition movement in Zimbabwe. A coalition that fails to secure electoral reforms is weak by definition and intent; it will have weak leadership, poor funding, poor mobilization and messaging.
Conclusions
Avoiding the worst-case scenario of the dead-end and achieving the best-case scenario of paradise calls for solid leadership within the coalition partners. It also calls for strategic thinking and planning to avoid identified pitfalls.
It is clear that the skewed playing field has caused fatigue within the opposition support and may attract voter apathy amongst an increasing number of voters in both rural and urban areas. It is therefore worthy noticing that in all the scenarios other than the paradise, Zanu PF is set to win the election, while a fighting chance requires electoral reform and the formation of an all-inclusive grand coalition.
This is likely to deliver a landslide Zanu PF victory for 2018, in spite of President Robert Mugabe’s old age and what many voters observe to be bad economic management. Going forward, an inclusive and deliberative approach to the coalition formation may mean a bottom up approach where civil society and political parties mobilise from below in order to re-energize the base.
The current situation indicates an elite coalition and reform agenda where the masses are completely left out. I propose a coalition for an electoral boycott as the only situation given the slow movement in the reform agenda. At the centre of the reform agenda should be the untangling of the hold exercised by traditional leaders on the voters across the countryside.
Dr Shonhe has a PhD from the University of KwaZulu-Natal and is interested in the political economy of development, especially Zimbabwe and Africa’s complex agrarian relations. This article first appeared in Gravitas.
