Attorney-General Virginia Mabhiza has issued a formal explanation of Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 3 (CAB3), urging the public to rely strictly on the text of the gazetted Bill and its accompanying memorandum.
Her office emphasises that the amendments concern the structure of the electoral cycle, not the presidential term limits, which remain governed by other provisions of the Constitution.
This clarification deserves careful engagement. But it also raises a constitutional question that cannot be avoided.
If the amendment only restructures institutions and does not benefit incumbents, why does it extend the time those incumbents remain in office?
The Legal Claim by the Attorney-General:
The Attorney-General’s position can be summarised as follows:
- CAB3 proposes amendments to Sections 92, 95, 143 and 158 of the Constitution.
- These provisions regulate the timing and conduct of elections.
- The amendment changes the electoral cycle from five years to seven years.
- The harmonised nature of elections remains intact.
- Presidential term limits themselves remain unchanged.
- Therefore the amendment is institutional rather than personal.
On its face, the argument appears tidy. But constitutional law does not operate on form alone. It operates on effect.
The Constitutional Effect:
Let us consider the practical outcome. Under the current Constitution:
• The President serves five-year terms.
• Parliament serves five-year terms.
• Elections are held every five years.
CAB3 proposes a seven-year electoral cycle.
This means that:
• The President elected in 2023 would remain in office for seven years instead of five.
• The current Parliament would remain in office for seven years instead of five.
Even if the words “term limit” remain unchanged, the duration of the term has been extended.
In constitutional law, that is not a technical adjustment. It is a substantive change.
The Incumbency Question:
The Attorney-General argues that the amendment is not designed to benefit office bearers. But the effect of the amendment is immediate.
The President currently in office would serve two additional years. Members of Parliament currently in office would serve two additional years.
In constitutional theory, this is precisely why most democratic constitutions include a safeguard:
Changes to the duration of terms normally apply only to future office holders, not current incumbents.
The principle exists to prevent what constitutional scholars call self-extension of mandate.
Section 328: The Safeguard:
Zimbabwe’s Constitution already anticipates this danger. Section 328(7) explicitly provides that amendments affecting presidential term limits cannot benefit the incumbent.
The intention of this provision is clear. The Constitution sought to prevent a sitting President from altering the rules in a way that extends their own tenure.
Yet if CAB3 extends the electoral cycle immediately, the incumbent President effectively receives a longer term than the Constitution originally allowed.
This raises a legitimate constitutional question. Is changing the duration of the electoral cycle functionally different from extending the term itself?
The Referendum Requirement:
The Constitution provides an additional safeguard that has not received sufficient attention in the Attorney-General’s explanation.
Section 328(9) establishes that when a constitutional amendment would allow an incumbent President to benefit from a change relating to term limits, the amendment cannot take effect unless approved through a national referendum.
Furthermore, the Constitution introduces an additional protection. Even after such a referendum, the benefit to the incumbent cannot take effect until at least six months have passed and a second referendum specifically approving that benefit is held.
This safeguard exists precisely to prevent a situation where those holding power amend the Constitution in ways that extend their own tenure without explicit public consent.
If CAB3 has the practical effect of extending the tenure of the current President and Parliament, the Constitution itself raises an unavoidable question:
Should the people of Zimbabwe not be asked directly whether they approve such a change?
The Timing Question:
There is another issue that deepens public concern. Senior ZANU-PF officials, including Politburo member Munyaradzi Paul Mangwana, have publicly explained the legal timing of the proposed amendment.
According to those explanations, the Bill must be passed before 4 September 2026, when the current presidential term reaches the three-year mark.
Under the Constitution, a presidential term counts fully once a President has served three years or more.
If the law redefining the electoral cycle comes into effect before that threshold, the current term could technically be reset under the new constitutional framework.
If that interpretation is correct, then the proposed amendment is not simply about institutional reform.
It is about legal timing with clear political consequences.
The Institutional Argument:
The Attorney-General’s defence relies heavily on the argument that the amendment reforms institutions rather than individuals.
But institutions do not serve terms. People do. When the electoral cycle is lengthened, the practical result is that specific individuals remain in power longer.
That is the constitutional reality.
A Simple Question for the Attorney-General:
The public debate therefore turns on one simple legal question.
If CAB3 is purely institutional reform, why does it immediately extend the time current office holders remain in power?
If the objective truly concerns institutional stability, the amendment could easily state that the new seven-year cycle begins with the next election, not the current one.
That approach would eliminate the appearance of self-benefit.
Why This Matters:
Constitutions are not ordinary laws. They exist precisely to restrain those who temporarily hold power.
When constitutional amendments appear to benefit the very officials proposing them, public trust inevitably declines.
That is why the framers of the 2013 Constitution insisted that changes affecting executive tenure be approached with extreme caution.
The Question of Intent:
The Attorney-General must also be aware that CAB3 did not emerge in a vacuum. The proposal followed a ZANU-PF conference resolution calling for mechanisms to extend President Mnangagwa’s tenure to 2030 without triggering a referendum.
If that was indeed the political objective behind the amendment, then the public debate must confront the constitutional implications honestly.
Because constitutional law does not examine only wording. It examines intent and effect.
The Need for Honest Constitutional Debate:
Attorney-General Mabhiza is correct in encouraging citizens to read the gazetted Bill. They should.
But reading the Bill also leads to the central question the public debate must answer. Is CAB3 an institutional reform of Zimbabwe’s electoral cycle?
Or is it, in practice, an extension of the current political mandate?
The Constitution of Zimbabwe deserves an answer grounded not only in legal wording, but in constitutional honesty.
Because constitutions are not judged only by what they say. They are judged by what they do.
