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Who will drive the bus: Mamvura or General Chiwenga? Will President Mnangagwa retire peacefully? (Part 1)

"A prevailing theory suggests that there was a “gentleman’s agreement” between Mnangagwa and the Generals, stipulating that Mnangagwa will serve only one term before handing power to General Chiwenga."

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Zimbabwe is at a crossroads where critical and cruel decisions are being made in the corridors of power. These decisions will determine the country’s direction for many years to come.

Within ZANU-PF, the main fight revolves around the succession race—specifically, who will succeed President Emmerson Mnangagwa when he leaves office in 2028 or in 2030, depending on whether he is sincere about pursuing the 2030 agenda and whether he will succeed to extend his term of office through the proposed seismic constitutional amendments.

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In this article, I examine the potential outcomes of ZANU-PF’s ruthless succession politics, focusing on whether Kudakwashe Tagwirei (whom I satirically refer to as “Mamvura”) will succeed in his presumed bid for the presidency, whether General Constantino Chiwenga will recover his political fortunes and succeed President Mnangagwa, and whether President Mnangagwa will ultimately retire peacefully.

General Chiwenga’s mistakes in ZANU-PF’s ruthless succession politics: Will he recover from them?

Since the 2017 transition, General Chiwenga has made a series of costly mistakes that undermine his path to becoming the next president of Zimbabwe. The first was ceding power to Emmerson Mnangagwa following the November 2017 coup.

I am saying this with the benefit of hindsight because at the time, Zimbabweans at large—including myself—did not view the decision by the generals to give power to Mnangagwa as tragic.

This is why the coup and the subsequent appointment of Mnangagwa were widely endorsed and celebrated, largely due to the euphoria of the moment.

Writing in the Big Saturday Read titled “The Problem of Militarization and Judicialization of Zimbabwean Politics,” Alex Magaisa noted that:

“The first question is whether the military generals who carried out the coup still believe they made the correct decisions in November 2017. The decisions can be broken into two parts: the decision to breach the command structure and remove Mugabe and second, the decision to install Mnangagwa as president. They may be convinced that removing Mugabe was the right call, but the decision on Mnangagwa has been severely tested over the last 4 years.

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“First, Zimbabwe is no better than it was when they carried out the coup. Corruption has flourished, with a coterie of associates and minions around Mnangagwa claiming a lion’s share of the dwindling national cake. When they removed Mugabe, they claimed they were targeting criminals around him. Four years later, it seems they might find more criminals around Mnangagwa than they saw milling around his predecessor”.

Magaisa was right. President Mnangagwa has failed to the point where it is now clear that those who risked everything to remove Mugabe did so in vain.

While the 2017 coup was executed with a set plan to install Mnangagwa as Mugabe’s successor, the generals had a window to change course, deciding against handing power to a man who had fallen into political oblivion.

Reports suggest that President Mugabe cautioned General Chiwenga and his colleagues, urging the General to assume the presidency himself rather than installing Mnangagwa. However, General Chiwenga insisted on the original plan.

Such magnanimity is rare in the self-seeking corridors of power. It is said that the generals enthroned Mnangagwa to give the transition a civilian face, thereby avoiding the perception of an outright military coup which would have attracted condemnation from SADC, the African Union, and the international community. While this was logical, alternative frameworks for the transition might have better mitigated that perception.

For example, since the country was approaching the 2018 election, the generals could have appointed a placeholder civilian president (other than Emmerson Mnangagwa) to lead the country until then.

General Chiwenga could have then contested the 2018 election as the ZANU-PF presidential candidate. The generals should have known, as Alex Magaisa notes in his Big Saturday Read, that “rulers that get into power through a coup might be grateful to their co-conspirators, but they do not trust them”.

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Magaisa further warned that leaders often fear the ambition or impatience of those who helped them seize power, leading to co-conspirators being jailed or meeting suspicious deaths.

This has proven true because since the coup, several generals have died under suspicious circumstances, while others were “promoted” or “redeployed” to dismantle any potential for a counter-coup.

However, it is important to note that the other key reason why the generals appointed Mnangagwa was the desire to preserve ZANU-PF’s order of succession.

The second mistake that General Chiwenga and his colleagues made was that they failed to negotiate and sign a written agreement with Emmerson Mnangagwa before installing him as President.

In the explosive dossier that he presented to the ZANU-PF politburo on 17 September 2025, General Chiwenga stated that: “During November 2017, we risked everything—our lives, our freedom, and our futures—to restore and defend our legacy, the Party, and the Constitution.”

Given the extreme risks associated with “Operation Restore Legacy” and the specific objectives for which it was executed, it logically follows that the generals needed to have a written, inviolable agreement with Mnangagwa before granting him power. At the very least, such an agreement should have addressed the following key issues:

  • The specific number of terms Mnangagwa would serve as President.
  • The specific legacy to be defended under Mnangagwa’s administration and the methods for doing so, especially uprooting corruption and going back to the values of the liberation struggle.
  • How power would be shared and how key decisions would be made during his term.
  • The identified candidate who would succeed President Mnangagwa.

Had the Generals negotiated a power transfer agreement, Mnangagwa might have been forced to make significant concessions due to his weakened political position at that time.

It is clear that the absence of such a formal deal granted him the latitude to act solely in his own interest. It appears that the Generals threw caution to the wind by trusting Mnangagwa—a man who is widely viewed as ruthless, crooked, and unforgiving.

However, a prevailing theory suggests that there was a “gentleman’s agreement” between Mnangagwa and the Generals, stipulating that Mnangagwa will serve only one term before handing power to General Chiwenga.

It could be on the basis of this agreement that General Chiwenga was appointed Vice President and other generals were given ministerial positions. However, given the risks that characterized the coup, it was necessary to have a written, firm agreement rather than something as loose as a gentleman’s agreement.

While President Mnangagwa might still have violated a written agreement, it would have provided the Generals with concrete evidence of bad faith to justify a rigorous and ruthless challenge to his departure from the agreement.

The third mistake that General Chiwenga made was believing that his contribution to the liberation struggle, his leading role in executing the 2017 coup, his stature and influence in the military, his strategic position within the ZANU-PF hierarchy, the 2017 “gentlemen’s agreement” and the unwritten order of succession in ZANU-PF made him the natural and undisputed successor of President Mnangagwa.

He must have remembered that the G40 faction disputed the view that Mnangagwa was the natural successor of Mugabe. The sense of entitlement may have caused General Chiwenga to rest on his laurels, only to be awakened by President Mnangagwa’s crooked moves to block him from becoming Zimbabwe’s next president, such as the 2030 agenda, the recalibration of the security sector, and the co-option of Kudakwashe Tagwirei into the ZANU-PF Central Committee.

Although the General had a strong chance of succeeding the President, he needed to do more groundwork to fortify his position by increasing his visibility, sharing his vision for Zimbabwe, and cultivating a robust support base within the structures of ZANU-PF.

In succession politics, visibility, mobilization, and transactional relationships are essential.

Unlike President Mnangagwa, General Chiwenga has the opportunity to appeal to the hearts and minds of those voters who are outside ZANU-PF, particularly fence-sitters and disgruntled opposition supporters.

To connect with the masses, he could shift from what is seen as an unforgiving command style—exemplified by phrases like “regerai vakomana, hatidi kuti muzoita hupenyu maremara handiti”—toward a unifying statesmanship.

This approach would involve presenting himself as a leader who is willing to engage across the political divide while emphasizing meritocracy, competence, and a firm stance against corruption and land barons.

Furthermore, he could champion beneficiation, constitutionalism, respect for human rights, dismantling the culture of political violence, healing the historical wounds that were caused by Gukurahundi and politically motivated violence, going back to the values and aspirations of the liberation struggle, adoption of Artificial Intelligence, moving the nation from polarization toward unity in diversity, and inclusive economic recovery.

He could also adopt a pan-African outlook, emphasizing the need for African unity rooted in the aspirations of the anti-colonial struggle. It is possible for the General to articulate these points in a manner that supports, rather than undermines or outshines, his principal, President Mnangagwa.

While the General has touched on these themes, he must lean further into this rhetoric. For instance, he has advocated for mineral beneficiation, the processing of our natural resources locally rather than exporting raw material. He warned against over-reliance on foreign investors, noting that they come to extract resources rather than build the nation for Zimbabweans.

He has also critiqued the “nouveau riche” (whom he termed zvigananda), arguing that they must build factories instead of distributing cars and cash like confetti. Furthermore, he has maintained that the liberation struggle was fought for all Zimbabweans, not a select few, and seems to be determined to take a firm stance against corruption.

Having taken the right direction in this regard, he now needs to demonstrate a genuine heart for all Zimbabweans, regardless of political affiliation. He needs to have a disposition that is tolerant of opposition politics.

This is the leadership that Zimbabwe needs at this juncture. Should the General become the next President of Zimbabwe, he must surround himself with astute and visionary advisors who can provide the sound guidance necessary to translate these ideas into action. I, Dr Moses Tofa, would be happy to be one of them provided that there is willingness to listen.

The fourth mistake that General Chiwenga made relates to his public and harsh handling of his divorce from his estranged wife, Marry. We do not know what happened between them, but the approach portrayed him as ruthless, uncaring, and unforgiving. He should have considered the implications for his reputation, not only as the Vice President but as an aspiring President.

By handling the divorce as he did, he unwittingly provided his political opponents with the ammunition to attack him in the future.

For example, Temba Mliswa has repeatedly questioned the source of his wealth, specifically referencing assets allegedly revealed during the divorce proceedings. He also argued that the General is unfit for the presidency because he denied Marry access to medical care and her children.

In a Big Saturday Read titled “The General’s Misadventure”, Alex Magaisa noted that: “the on-going legal duel… goes far beyond a dispute over nuptials”, adding that while a late settlement was reached, it had already “scandalised the presidency and caused many skeletons to tumble out of the Chiwenga family closet”.

However, we must acknowledge that General Chiwenga’s subsequent marriage to the distinguished Colonel Miniyothabo “Minnie” Baloyi has rebranded and transformed his public image in remarkable ways.

The fifth mistake that General Chiwenga made was delivering speeches and taking actions that damaged his public image as a leader. For example, he was reportedly linked to the shooting of protesters in 2018 and 2019.

A leader who kills citizens is a curse to any nation. Leaders must always recognise that life is sacrosanct and that no one deserves to be killed on account of politics.

Second, when doctors and nurses went on strike between 2018 and 2020, he threatened and insulted them instead of negotiating. He dismissed many, labelled them “casual labourers”, and accused them of being politically motivated.

General Chiwenga’s sixth mistake was that he crossed the proverbial Rubicon too early when he presented a dossier to the ZANU-PF Politburo on 17th September 2025. In that document, he accused President Mnangagwa’s close allies, notably Kudakwashe Tagwirei, Wicknell Chivhayo, Scott Sakupwanya, and Delish Nguwaya, of egregious corruption.

This was, in essence, a direct criticism of the President himself. The General also censured Mnangagwa for “betraying Operation Restore Legacy” and pursuing the 2030 agenda. The points he raised in the dossier are sincere and compelling.

One must acknowledge the General’s pain and anger. He sacrificed everything in November 2017 to hand power to Mnangagwa, but he now faces a betrayal that even the most magnanimous person could not forgive. However, the presentation of the dossier was a strategic error because it provided President Mnangagwa and his allies with the platform to counter-attack him and cement the position that the General should never be allowed to succeed Mnangagwa.

It was not therefore surprising that President Mnangagwa responded to the dossier with a rebuttal filled with innuendos, characterizing both the dossier and the General as: “ignorant”, “emotional outburst”, “of no consequence”, “false and malicious”, “clearly ignorant”, “in denial”, “not moving with the Party”, “immature”, “not a good follower”, “cannot be a leader”, “political rhetoric”, “disrespectful”, “reprehensible”, “claiming heroism for work done by many”, “distorting the historical narrative for personal and political gain”, “patently disregarding the resolutions of the party”, “meddling and intrusive”, “attacking the President” and “serious disrespect for the President”.

If things reach a point where such “charges” are brought against you in ZANU-PF succession politics, you must know you are on your way to a political Waterloo, unless you have a decisive counter-plan up your sleeve. This is a perilous stage in the succession battle, particularly if the General is not yet prepared to launch a surgical strike against his opponents to seize power.

In the tumultuous and unforgiving waters of ZANU-PF succession politics, it is always prudent to play your cards close to your chest, making it difficult for adversaries to discern your plans.

The 2030 agenda, the recalibration of the security sector, the co-option of Kudakwashe Tagwirei into the Central Committee, and the proposed constitutional amendments are tactics being used by President Mnangagwa to provoke the General into making costly mistakes which would justify a forceful response from Mnangagwa and his allies.

It is therefore important for the General to avoid falling into this snare. While he has every reason to oppose President Mnangagwa’s absurd manoeuvres, he must do so occasionally and tactically to avoid open confrontation unless he is ready to strike.

For example, when the 2030 agenda was first introduced, the General should have feigned total support—publicly chanting the slogan while strategically undermining it in private.

This approach would have denied his opponents a platform for confrontation and might have prevented or at least reduced the purging of his allies from key party and security positions, allowing him to maintain the influence needed for a surprise counter-move.

Now that the General has made these mistakes, the question is whether he will recover and succeed in his ambition to take over from President Mnangagwa. It is clear that Mnangagwa has done and continues to do everything possible to close every avenue General Chiwenga might use to ascend to power, especially a military coup and ZANU-PF’s internal leadership selection processes.

The General’s political and military base has been significantly eroded through the removal and redeployment of his allies. With many of the original coup-era generals having passed away, he is increasingly isolated. Unlike former President Mugabe who was caught by the coup unawares, Mnangagwa has the benefit of hindsight, having risen to power via a coup.

Consequently, he understands how to insulate himself from a coup. He is also aware that a successful coup against him would make him plunge into a dungeon of misery for the rest of his life. He is therefore committed to protecting himself by any means necessary and does not hesitate to take ruthless action against his political opponents, including eliminating them, if the need arises.

At present, President Mnngagwa appears to have outmanoeuvred General Chiwenga. However, the General’s fate is not yet sealed. Here are his available options, in no particular order. The first option is for him to concede defeat if the odds against him are insurmountable.

Under this option, he would prioritize negotiating a safe transition to life outside politics, hoping that by a stroke of luck, he may have the opportunity to fight again in the future and rise to the presidency.

The risk, however, is that once he is out of politics, his opponents will likely make sure that they politically bury him, leaving him with no chance of a political comeback.

While this path may guarantee him physical and material safety, he might die as an isolated, bitter, dejected, defeated, and angry man—a state that would ruthlessly devour his peace of mind.

It would be a miserable closure of a life of company, power, service, gruelling sacrifice, and adventure.

The second option is for the General to pretend to beat his sword into ploughshare. This allows him to de-escalate the situation while strategically planning from closed doors.

From there, he could launch a swift, precise, and surprise attack to seize power. But he must know that they are always watching his moves. He must avoid doing anything that could lead to his firing from ZANU-PF.

Survival is a victory in itself, offering opportunities to organize, adapt, and strike at the right moment. The third option is for him to resign at a strategic time, flee into the diaspora, collaborate with opposition leaders, and organize a massive political resistance against the regime.

This would make him follow the historical precedent where authoritarian regimes were toppled by coalitions of opposition parties and former ruling-party insiders. He would bring invaluable experience and deep knowledge of ZANU-PF, including the inner workings of its election rigging machinery. On the extreme end, the general may choose to take some “nuclear” options that I am not comfortable to discuss in this article.

Regardless of the option he chooses, the General must always exercise extreme caution because his political opponents are now seeking his life, particularly through poisoning or assassination. As Zimbabweans, we recognize that the General has been at the heart of ZANU-PF—a corrupt, incompetent, and authoritarian system that has brought our nation to its current state.

However, if he happens to become the next President of Zimbabwe, he will find himself standing at the very juncture that President Mnangagwa stood in November 2017. He will have a unique opportunity to steer the country in the right direction for the first time since independence.

Should he take this path, he will enjoy massive goodwill from both the Zimbabwean people and the international community. I believe that, at the very least, he must form a unity government and work with the opposition to rebuild the country.

He must appoint competent and visionary individuals to positions of power regardless of their political views and affiliation. He should carefully consider the roadmap I outlined in my article: “Turning the Corner: The 15 Non-Negotiable Priorities for a Possible Chiwenga Presidency in Zimbabwe”. I strongly encourage the successor of President Mnangagwa to implement this roadmap, whether it will be General Chiwenga or someone else.

It is my hope that whoever succeeds President Mnangagwa is someone who loves the country, has empathy for the people of Zimbabwe, and is willing to genuinely work with Zimbabweans across the political divide for the good of the country. Although I am not a member or supporter of ZANU-PF, I wish the General well in his political aspirations and I desire to write his autobiography.

President Mnangagwa’s mistakes and failures: Will he retire peacefully?

At this stage, President Mnangagwa’s primary concern is not how long he will remain in power, but whether he will retire peacefully. Ironically and tragically, the more he tries to secure a peaceful retirement, the more he is making and taking decisions that will make his retirement a nightmare. In this section, I outline the failures of President Mnangagwa’s administration since 2017 and assess the likelihood of his peaceful retirement.

Squandering the November 2017 good will

Since taking power in 2017, President Mnangagwa has consistently failed to lead the country in the right direction. In fact, he has done everything possible to steer it in the wrong direction. In 2017, Zimbabweans from across the political divide united against Mugabe and supported Mnangagwa’s rise.

This was because they expected, at the very least, that he would turn a new page by forming a government of national unity; implementing economic, electoral, and political reforms; reintegrating Zimbabwe into the community of nations; and uprooting corruption.

They hoped that he would embark on a genuine land reform program, rebuild infrastructure, revive health and education systems, and uproot the culture of violence and human rights abuses that characterized the Mugabe era.

To many Zimbabweans, 2017 felt like a “1980 moment”. It was characterised by an atmosphere of high optimism and a desire to “give Mnangagwa a chance” despite his alleged involvement in past atrocities committed against citizens.

Beyond the citizens, the international community, including the British government, embraced Mnangagwa’s rise to power. It was a rare opportunity to unite and rebuild a nation that had endured decades of corrupt, incompetent, and oppressive governance.

It was a moment to transition from toxic, polarized politics to a collaborative political culture. However, it did not take long before Mnangagwa recklessly squandered the goodwill. He chose to be selfish instead of working with the opposition and the rest of the Zimbabwean society for the greater good.

It is now clear that in November 2017, it was delusional for citizens to expect him to form a unity government and work with the opposition. He has demonstrated that he has a burning obsession to obliterate the opposition and any other centres of power within and outside ZANU-PF and turn Zimbabwe into his fiefdom.

Since taking power in 2017, he has focused on dismantling dissent and buying loyalty using cash and cars. For example, he leveraged the court judgement to destroy the MDC; utilized Sengezo Tshabangu, the parliament, and the judiciary to dismantle and coopt the Citizens Coalition for Change; ruthlessly targeted brave and principled leaders like Job Sikhala and Jacob Ngarivhume; and used the Political Actors Dialogue (POLAD) to co-opt the opposition under a false image of tolerance and inclusivity.

President Mnangagwa has traditionally been regarded as a corrupt and cruel politician who played a central role in some of the worst atrocities committed by the government, including Gukurahundi. These perceptions have persisted since the early 1980s.

Upon succeeding President Mugabe, he invested in a massive rebranding exercise that involved international public relations firms. He famously claimed that he is “as soft as wool”, but it is now clear that he was lying.

In 2018 and 2019, he deployed the army to suppress protests. The military used live ammunition and killed civilians—things that did not occur during Mugabe’s authoritarian rule. Dozens of civilians were wounded and tortured, with reports that security forces used rape as a political weapon. Mugabe was sophisticated in his authoritarianism, Mnangagwa is crude.

President Mnangagwa is seeking to dismantle the constitution in ways that would shock even the darkest conscience. He is willing to burn Zimbabwe and become the president of the ashes. This is why he is seeking to extend presidential terms from five to seven years, replace the direct election of the President by citizens with a parliamentary vote, and calibrate the balance of executive authority to further consolidate power.

The 2030 agenda and the proposed constitutional amendments have created serious enemies and opponents for him, both within and outside ZANU-PF. Zimbabwe is now being spoken about across the world for wrong reasons. This is not necessary.

Within ZANU-PF, these political moves will make it difficult for the party to have a stable transition of power when President Mnanagwa eventually leaves office.

Zimbabweans across the political divide, including elements in ZANU-PF that are opposed to the proposed constitutional amendments, must join hands and fight valiantly against this vile agenda.

President Mnangagwa is making the tragic mistake of creating more enemies at a time that he must be focusing on building bridges and preparing for a peaceful retirement.

From Mugabe to the bishop of Sapatina-Sapatina politics.

President Mnangagwa has a dull and tasteless appearance. He lacks the mobilizational capacity, charisma, and national appeal that Nelson Chamisa embodies—and he knows it. His electoral performances testify to this.

This is why he relies extensively on corruption to buy political loyalty. The military removed Mugabe, claiming they were targeting criminals around him and seeking to rescue the country from the jaws of corruption.

But today, there are more criminals around President Mnangagwa than there ever were around President Mugabe. Under Mugabe, corruption was embedded in the system; under Mnangagwa, corruption has become the system itself.

This is why Tendai Biti, Zimbabwe’s former Minister of Finance and a leading opposition figure, calls him “the bishop of corruption”.

Corruption has deepened to the point where criminals plundering the state are now celebrated and idolized—not for funding development, but for distributing cars and cash. We are losing millions of dollars to corruption and millions more to a farcical fight against it by the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission.

Individuals like Hopewell Chin’ono, who have done a sterling job of exposing graft, are thrown into jail, while looters such as Obadiah Moyo, Prisca Mupfumira, and Henrietta Rushwaya are treated like royalty.

The conscience of the citizenry has been corrupted such that many of them twerk for criminals and tenderpreneurs in search of handouts. Even professional civil servants have joined the queue.

Mnangagwa has taught the nation that sycophancy pays and that professionalism, education, skills, and hard work do not pay.

Explain to me how a government can award a tender amounting to US$87 million to be spent on goats under the Presidential Goat Scheme when our hospitals and schools are in ruins. Can you imagine that the tender was awarded to Blackdeck, a company that operated fraudulent tax documents and received an advance payment of over US$7 million?

Explain to me how a whole president can comfortably associate with corrupt characters that are giving out cars and cash like confetti while citizens are dying daily in our dilapidated hospitals, when children are learning from under trees, and when our people are swimming in sewage?

In fact, the President has joined them in giving out cars and cash. The state house has become a place where people come and get handouts instead of a place where interventions that lift everyone out of poverty are made.

Imagine that a Madzibaba who was at the state house for a “service”, simply said “Sapatina-Sapatina” and he was rewarded with a brand-new 2025 Toyota Fortuner GD6 (worth approximately US$65 000) and US$20 000 in cash.

Imagine that people are being given cars and cash for twerking. In Joseph Chinotimba’s words “Munongoti chero atambisa magaro motope vanhu vasina nebasa mota”.

Imagine that Mnagagwa allows the formation and operations of ridiculous, sycophantic, and reprehensible “for ED” Zanu PF affiliates like “Top Soup for ED”, “Zimbabwe Anti Presidential Criticism”, and “Presidential Mafia”.

These affiliates are being used to suppress independent opinion, gain access to state resources, and shield individuals from accountability for crimes they would have committed.

For example, three months after releasing a video announcing he had formed the ZANU-PF affiliate “Musicians for ED,” rapper Tinashe Gonzara was sentenced to 10 months in prison on drug possession charges. It is clear that he wanted to use the affiliate to peddle drugs with impunity.

We are losing significant revenue because we are exporting our natural resources as raw materials instead of processing them locally and exporting them as finished products. This is because we lack the industrial capacity to process our raw materials.

Instead of investing in building that capacity, the President and his allies are distributing cars and cash. To make matters worse, these handouts do not stem from an altruistic heart, but from one seeking to corrupt and co-opt the recipients.

It defies logic. One of the reasons Africa remains poor is our tendency to spend resources on liabilities instead of assets. We need a mindset shift. Someone who receives a car worth US$150,000 today will not have that car in 20 years.

However, if that money is used for acquiring assets, it can create generational wealth. This is the fundamental difference between the rich and the poor. It is therefore unsettling when a head of state leads a primitive campaign of distributing liabilities instead of encouraging citizens to invest in assets.

This is why other countries do not take Africa seriously. If you juxtapose the “zvigananda” and “Sapatina-Sapatina” politics that we are seeing today with the values and aspirations of the liberation struggle, you will visualize true heroes like Herbert Chitepo and Edgar Tekere turning in their graves.

No one who fought in the liberation struggle with a clean heart ever imagined that ZANU-PF would become what it is today—not one.

Tendai Ruben Mbofana, in an article titled “ZANU PF for sale: How wealth has replaced liberation in Zimbabwe”, asks a painful question: “Could Herbert Chitepo have ever imagined, even in his darkest nightmares, that ZANU PF would come to this?

The last time I was in Zimbabwe, I visited Village 4A in Manyuchi, located a few kilometres from Birchenough Bridge. This is one of the villages where I grew up. My heart sank when I saw the primitive conditions the villagers are still enduring almost half a century into independence.

Only a few villagers have private boreholes. The rest still rely on the same community borehole that we used many decades ago when I was in primary school. Due to high demand, villagers spend several hours a day taking turns to fetch water.

I couldn’t help but imagine the impact even one of the cars gifted to individuals by Wicknell Chivayo or the President could have on this village. President Mnangagwa has taken transactional politics to an unprecedented and shockingly unreasonable level.

Instead of giving a single person a car worth over $150,000 plus $50,000 in cash, those funds could transform villages, hospitals, clinics, and schools—the very places voters interact with daily.

This would make the President’s “successes” visible to the public, rather than giving cars and cash to individuals, some of whom are comfortably off.

Some Zimbabweans have advanced the flawed argument that citizens should not dictate how individuals like Wicknell Chivayo spend their wealth, asserting that public service delivery is the sole responsibility of the government. This view is both narrow and uninformed.

First, it overlooks the fact that these individuals are accused of plundering state resources through inflated tenders and corrupt dealings. The money they are giving as confetti does not belong to them, but to the state.

Consequently, there is a moral and legal imperative for these funds to be directed back into public services.  Second, even if we assume that they legitimately acquired the wealth, it is not reasonable and moral for them to spend it on giving handouts for political patronage when social services have crumbled.

While the government bears the primary responsibility for delivering social services, a modern state relies on a diverse range of actors, including charities, businesses, and international organisations—to fill critical gaps. Through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), private individuals and entities play a vital role in complementing the state’s efforts to improve the lives of all citizens.

For example, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is a global health initiative by the United States to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It has been the primary funder of Zimbabwe’s HIV/AIDS response since 2006, significantly reducing new infections and deaths.

This was made possible because the U.S. government used its taxpayers’ money to support the fight against HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe.

Imagine someone who survived because of PEPFAR claiming that the zviganandas have the right to use their money as they wish while public hospitals decay.

If, instead of establishing PEPFAR, the United States had used that money to buy luxury cars and distribute cash for political loyalty—as the zviganandas are doing—many Zimbabweans would have died. The logic is basic: when those with money use it to make public goods available, society makes progress.

Let us look at the NGOs operating in Zimbabwe. Many Zimbabweans are employed by NGOs funded by private philanthropic foundations. This funding has enabled them to implement development projects while earning an income to support their families.

This is possible because these foundations choose to use their resources to benefit society rather than buying luxury cars or giving cash to individuals. I am highlighting this to show that the argument that individuals must use their money however they want is intellectually lazy.

Our corrupt and incompetent politicians rely on this ignorance among the masses. However, it is important to acknowledge that President Mnangagwa has embarked on infrastructural projects that were ignored under President Mugabe, especially road construction.

The only problem is that these projects are often used as avenues to loot the honesty shop. That is why, each time I look at a development project like a road, instead of appreciating it, I ask myself how much money was embezzled in its name.

From intellectualism to kongonya, korokoza, and Mushika-shika

Despite his many faults, Mugabe understood the importance of surrounding himself with a few intellectuals to give him counsel. His weakness, however, was that he wanted competent but compromised intellectuals, those who would tell him what he wanted to hear.

Unlike Mugabe, Mnangagwa appears to favour intellectually shallow minds: those who are competent at sycophancy, crudeness, and corruption. He has created a kongonya dispensation. You see him in the company of political and religious charlatans and opportunists such as Jay Israel, Uebert Angel, and Tatenda Mavetera.

Can you explain why, in an era defined by Artificial Intelligence and ground-breaking technology, a strategic portfolio like the Ministry of ICT is led by someone known primarily for being a kongonya dancer? How do we expect our digital future to be shaped by such a person?

Can you explain to me why Uebert Angel was appointed Special Presidential Envoy and Ambassador-at-Large to Europe and the Americas? Imagine what will happen to this country if you have competent people such as Fadzayi Mahere and Tendai Biti in key government positions.

Under President Mnangagwa, the State House has become a joke—a desecrated site. Mnangagwa established the Presidential Advisory Council (PAC), but it went nowhere because he is unreceptive to new ideas.

Today, if I ask you what Zimbabwe’s foreign policy is, you cannot say anything beyond “Zimbabwe is a friend to all and an enemy to none” and “Zimbabwe is open for business”.

The truth is that President Mnangagwa has crossed a line that even the most tolerant person could not endure. This must stop. I will see you in the second part of this article.

Dr. Moses Tofa is a Research Leader, political analyst, and self-critical Pan-Africanist. He holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Johannesburg and a PhD in Conflict Studies from the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal. He is an Investigator at the University of Andes, Colombia. He writes in his capacity. He can be reached at [email protected], Twitter handle: @DrDrMTofa.


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