Chamisa can still stage a second coming, but only if he follows this advice to a tee

As a zealous political science student, I today wear the hat of political advisor to one of the most promising opposition politicians to have come out of Zimbabwe.

Nelson Chamisa’s career as a politician and presidential aspirant can still be resurrected even as it appears that disappointments and a multiplicity of other systemic pogroms have crushed his spirit for good – reducing him to a social media influencer while ZANU PF entrenches itself with securocratic plunder and tenderpreneurial patronage.

Yet no matter the exhaustion Chamisa feels, he remains a formidable factor in Zimbabwe’s power matrix, who did his supporters a disservice by taking his ball home.

The nation needs a vibrant opposition to keep ZANU PF in check because what we have now is a de facto one-party state prone to governmental excesses. It never bodes well for the nation for one social formation to monopolise the political space.

Arguably, nobody today embodies the tantalising promise of change in Zimbabwe quite like Chamisa.

His career, a tapestry woven with threads of soaring ambition, electoral brinkmanship, and institutional fragility, offers a profound case study in the perils and potentials of opposition leadership under authoritarian rule.

Emerging from the youth ranks of the Movement for Democratic Change in the late 1990s, Chamisa swiftly ascended as a charismatic orator, blending evangelical fervour with sharp political messaging to captivate urban youth, professionals, and the diaspora.

His early tenure as MDC spokesperson honed his media savvy, while his stint as Minister of Information and Communication Technology during the 2009 to 2013 Government of National Unity illustrated his capacity for pragmatic governance within coalitions.

This period, marked by tentative economic stabilisation, allowed Chamisa to position himself as a bridge between generations, challenging the ageing cadre of ZANU PF’s liberation-era elite.

The pivotal moment arrived in 2018, following the death of Morgan Tsvangirai, when Chamisa grabbed leadership of the MDC Alliance. This transition symbolised a youthful renaissance, injecting vitality into an opposition weary from decades of repression.

Chamisa’s rhetorical style, often laced with biblical allusions, framed the struggle as a divine quest against corruption and economic malaise, resonating deeply in a nation grappling with hyperinflation and unemployment.

In the 2018 presidential elections, he garnered 44 percent of the vote, a remarkable feat amid accusations of ballot stuffing and voter intimidation by ZANU PF.

His subsequent court challenge, though dismissed, underscored his willingness to confront the regime’s judicial capture, drawing international attention to electoral flaws.

By 2022, facing legal machinations that stripped him of the MDC moniker, Chamisa rebranded as the Citizens’ Coalition for Change, adopting a vibrant yellow motif to signify grassroots empowerment.

The CCC’s performance in the 2023 polls, securing substantial parliamentary and council seats, further affirmed his mobilising prowess, even as ZANU PF under Emmerson Mnangagwa claimed victory through contested means.

Yet, Chamisa’s narrative is not one of unalloyed triumph; it is punctuated by strategic miscalculations that expose the vulnerabilities of personality-centric politics in a securitised state.

His doctrine of “strategic ambiguity”, intended to shield the movement from infiltration by withholding formal structures, instead invited chaos.

This opacity enabled ZANU PF surrogates, such as Sengezo Tshabangu, to orchestrate recalls and internal disruptions, effectively neutering the CCC’s parliamentary presence.

Journalists like Hopewell Chin’ono have critiqued this approach as evasive and self-serving, arguing it prioritises Chamisa’s enigmatic persona over transparent governance.

Internally, allegations of autocratic tendencies abound: Chamisa’s unilateral dissolution of leadership bodies has alienated key allies, fostering defections and factionalism.

His reluctant acceptance of the 2023 results, despite glaring irregularities including voter suppression in opposition strongholds, diluted his image as a resolute fighter, allowing Mnangagwa to entrench power without organised resistance.

These personal flaws are amplified by Zimbabwe’s broader political ecosystem, where ZANU PF’s patronage networks and security forces orchestrate systematic “pogroms” against dissenters through arrests, abductions, and economic sabotage.

Chamisa has endured assassination attempts and relentless harassment, yet his failure to cultivate resilient parallel institutions, such as shadow administrations or community cooperatives, has left him exposed.

Historical parallels with Joshua Nkomo illuminate this shortfall; Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union built enduring alliances before its coerced merger with ZANU in 1987, a depth Chamisa has yet to achieve amid rivalries with figures like Douglas Mwonzora and Tendai Biti, the latter retiring in 2024.

Economically, Chamisa’s pledges on employment and anti-corruption strike chords, but they lack detailed policy blueprints, often eclipsed by ZANU PF’s command of state coffers.

As of mid-2025, Chamisa’s influence endures, buoyed by his June declaration of a political “reloading”, yet his silence on pressing issues like the volatile ZiG currency or Mnangagwa’s push for term extensions signals inertia.

Some observers perceive him as subtly co-opted, neutralised within ZANU PF’s authoritarian framework, highlighting how his career encapsulates unfulfilled potential: a disruptor thwarted by tactical lapses and an implacable regime.

The question of whether Chamisa can revive his fortunes is affirmative, albeit contingent on navigating a volatile terrain with unprecedented acuity. Zimbabwe’s political volatility provides fertile ground.

ZANU PF, despite its hegemony, grapples with internal schisms, as factions aligned with Vice President Constantino Chiwenga may oppose Mnangagwa’s 2030 extension ambitions, potentially fracturing the monolith and creating entry points for opposition manoeuvres.

Persistent economic distress, including rampant inflation, joblessness, and the ZiG’s precariousness, stokes discontent among the youth demographic, comprising over 60 percent of the populace under 25 years old, which forms Chamisa’s bedrock support.

The opposition’s current disarray, evidenced by 250 000 alleged defections to ZANU PF in 2025 and splintered CCC factions, underscores the vacuum for a coalescing leader.

Chamisa’s lingering charisma, manifest in robust social media engagement and grassroots calls for his resurgence, equips him to fill this void.

Nevertheless, formidable obstacles loom. His January 2024 resignation from the CCC, invoked to counter infiltration, spawned a leadership hiatus; by November 2025, his touted “blue” initiative has yielded scant progress, with detractors branding him aloof and presumptuous.

Voter apathy, projected through diminished turnout, and ZANU PF’s repressive tactics, such as incinerating opposition facilities, threaten to marginalise him further.

Revival necessitates reinvention beyond oratory: harnessing digital activism, global oversight, and coalitions to exploit regime excesses.

Drawing from historical exemplars, such as Lech Wałęsa’s post-martial law resurgence in Poland or Aung San Suu Kyi’s dogged opposition in Myanmar before the coup, demonstrates how charismatic icons can rebound during transitional junctures, provided they adapt strategically to evolving dynamics.

Should Chamisa inaugurate a fresh party, mitigating infiltration by state security agents, a perennial tactic in ZANU PF’s playbook of co-opting adversaries, demands meticulous countermeasures inspired by counterintelligence from resilient authoritarian resistance movements, including Poland’s Solidarity or South Africa’s African National Congress under apartheid.

The CCC’s downfall via proxies stemmed from structural vagueness; a successor must prioritise fortification.

First, institutional architecture should emphasise transparency and accountability. A federalised model with autonomous regional branches, each empowered yet governed by a publicly endorsed constitution, decentralises authority and curtails centralised sabotage.

Open primaries for leadership elections diminish arbitrary selections prone to moles, while compulsory financial transparency and independent audits by civil society entities deter corruption.

For illustration, Solidarity’s underground networks in the 1980s maintained cohesion through codified rules, thwarting communist infiltration.

Second, stringent vetting and security measures are imperative. A layered vetting panel, integrating seasoned loyalists, diaspora analysts, and AI-driven background verifications scrutinising social media and affiliations, forms the frontline.

Loyalty affirmations, supplemented by polygraph examinations for critical posts, and periodic role rotations disrupt embedded agents. Encrypted tools like Signal, fortified with multi-factor authentication and routine cybersecurity assessments, safeguard communications.

The ANC’s intelligence wings during exile exemplify this, employing rigorous screening to preserve integrity amid apartheid espionage.

Third, recruitment should anchor in grassroots and communal foundations. Initiating from localised cells, vetted by community leaders rather than expansive gatherings susceptible to penetration, ensures organic expansion.

Focus on thematic campaigns, such as water provision initiatives, cultivates allegiance through practical deliverables like solidarity funds.

Exclusion of suspected ZANU PF affiliates via public record cross-references mirrors Otpor’s Serbian model in the 1990s, where community trust insulated against Milosevic’s secret police.

Fourth, external partnerships and vigilance enhance defences. Collaborations with global non-governmental organisations, including Amnesty International, provide anti-surveillance training and ongoing oversight.

Dedicated legal units preemptively contest infiltrator moves in tribunals, while fostering whistleblower cultures with confidential channels incentivises disclosures. Serbia’s Otpor again illustrates: international alliances amplified scrutiny, deterring regime overreach.

Fifth, proactive intelligence involves forming “red teams” to mimic infiltration drills, identifying weaknesses. Power dispersion averts leadership decapitation, and upon detection, prompt public oustings portray such episodes as regime frailty, dissuading replicas.

This multifaceted strategy, rooted in proven resistance paradigms, fortifies while sustaining vitality.

To surmount historical constraints and pogroms en route to authority, Chamisa must synthesise Machiavellian realism, Sun Tzu’s artful stratagems, and contemporary hybrid tactics, evolving from ethical crusader to shrewd operator.

Zimbabwe’s transformation eschews straightforward ballots, favouring multifaceted erosion of ZANU PF’s credibility toward negotiated shifts or 2028 electoral triumphs, or sooner if Mnangagwa’s prolongation stumbles.

A phased blueprint, informed by political doctrine and local verities, charts this course.

In the initial reconsolidation and rebranding phase, spanning zero to six months, Chamisa should unveil a “People’s Renewal Movement” under a blue banner evoking optimism and solidarity, distinct from CCC’s imprecision.

A manifesto fusing social democratic elements, like youth-oriented land redistribution, with liberal economic reforms targeting remittances and informal enterprises, addresses core afflictions.

Invoking Antonio Gramsci’s “war of position”, cultivate cultural dominance through artistic, musical, and religious avenues, subverting ZANU PF’s patriotic hegemony.

For unity, orchestrate a broad alliance with opposition vestiges, including Mwonzora’s MDC and Biti’s circles, via mediated dialogues offering equitable roles, emulating Nelson Mandela’s inclusive ANC ethos.

Resource mobilisation entails diaspora-backed crowdfunding, evading state financial chokeholds, alongside cadre instruction in non-violent methodologies from luminaries like Gene Sharp, disseminated digitally.

The subsequent mobilisation and erosion stage, from six to 18 months, entails grassroots insurgency. Deploy “citizen assemblies” in rural ZANU PF bastions, proffering micro-interventions like communal agriculture to erode loyalties.

Exploit social platforms for precision outreach, magnifying corruption revelations through purloined documents. Legally and internationally, contest Mnangagwa’s extension via constitutional avenues, courting Chiwenga sympathisers amid rifts.

Engage regional bodies like the Southern African Development Community, the African Union, and the European Union for reform-linked sanctions; internationalise plights akin to Venezuelan opposition tactics, compelling donor stipulations.

Economically, forge alternative systems, including cooperatives and digital finance applications, diminishing patronage reliance. Spotlight ZiG shortcomings to incite dissent, yet eschew violence in favour of targeted boycotts and labour actions.

The culminating confrontation and transition phase, 18 to 36 months, prioritises electoral readiness. Safeguard polls through trained observers, blockchain-parallel counts, and biometric demands.

If manipulated, transition to persistent demonstrations, adopting Hong Kong’s decentralised, fluid “umbrella” approaches to elude suppressions.

Contingencies for intensified pogroms include exile contingencies for operational continuity. Capitalise on ZANU PF infighting, positioning the movement as an impartial facilitator in elite accords, per Arend Lijphart’s consociational framework.

The ultimate objective: power-sharing or decisive wins via base attrition, leveraging 2025 defection patterns. Benchmarks encompass 50 percent youth participation, foreign arbitration, and fiscal meltdowns precipitating yields.

This trajectory compels Chamisa to forsake hubris for modesty, vagueness for lucidity, and solitude for partnerships. Dereliction invites obscurity; triumph could shatter ZANU PF’s 45-year grip, heralding authentic renewal.

In politics, adaptability reigns supreme; Chamisa must metamorphose or perish.