Dear Reader,
The ruling ZANU-PF party says there will be no referendum on Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 3, come hell or thunder.
Yet its political actions increasingly resemble a party preparing for one.
I am informed through research that factional strategists within the ruling party have not ruled out a referendum as a last option.
More importantly, earlier internal state agents’ assessments suggest the Bill could face a significant and humiliating defeat under a free and fair national vote.
However, their strategists now see a tiny window. Repression of opposition, fragmented resistance, muted and ambiguous voices from critical actors, and internal delegitimisation by party-state structures have created conditions for a reassessment.
Reader, let us revisit the Bill. It was gazetted on 16 February 2026. At its core, the proposal removes the direct election of the President by citizens and transfers that power to Members of Parliament.
It extends the term of both the President and Parliament from five to seven years. It allows the President to appoint additional Senators, while weakening institutions that oversee elections, gender equality, and aspects of judicial accountability.
This is the context in which the current wave of mobilisation must be understood.
In Mashonaland West, ZANU-PF’s provincial leadership is running structured awareness campaigns on the Bill. District by district, party members and local structures are being engaged.
Similar processes are reported in Mashonaland East in Mutoko, and in Harare in areas such as Mabvuku.
This is coordinated, systematic, and expected to spread across all ten provinces in the next few days.
This resembles groundwork for a national referendum campaign.
ZANU PF’s structures are being activated. Messages are being tested with state agents quietly observing responses. At the same time, mapping loyalties and identfying weak points.
Alongside this, the political space is tightening for opposing voices.
On 23 March 2026, Tendai Biti, convenor of the Constitution Defenders Forum, was granted bail with conditions that bar him from convening grassroots meetings on the Bill. This has direct political consequences. Mobilisation capacity is being constrained at a critical moment.
Reports from Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights on 24 March 2026 point to an increase in violations. This signals a broader pattern of pressure on dissent.
If there was certainty that no referendum would take place, such restrictions would be less necessary. Actors like Timba, Madhuku’s networks, and women and students’ movements would not face constraints at grassroots level.
I have also picked disturbing indications that, if a referendum is eventually triggered, it may not follow previous models.
Earlier referendums in 2000 and 2013 allowed citizens to vote anywhere using a national ID. That created flexibility.
Current hard-core signals from within ZANU-PF point to a constituency-based approach.
Their preference is for voting to be territorially fixed, allowing administrative control over participation and predetermined outcomes.
This is the context in which current actions must be read.
Progressive Zimbabweans cannot organise on the basis of ZANU-PF’s official statements alone.
Organisation must respond to observable actions and counter-intelligence.
If a referendum is ever to be called, groundwork will already be in place.
Preparation cannot therefore be reactive. It must be anticipatory.
Organisation must be built at constituency and polling station level.
In authoritarian settings, outcomes are often shaped before the public event.
The referendum being denied today can emerge tomorrow, but offered in half measure.
So one way is to organise according to scenarios, including this wild card scenario.
