By Brighton Mutebuka
The Zimbabwean political question is simply about misgovernance and rampant / unbridled corruption. ZANU PF + the Military control the levers of state power.
It’s a quasi political military-party hybrid / organisation. This dates back to the 1970s war of liberation. It’s a deeply ingrained concept.
In fact, it isn’t even ZANU PF, it’s a small clique, a cabal which exerts control and focuses on looting state resources and targeting real and perceived opponents.
This cabal has got no appetite for genuine reforms. It thrives on crony capitalism / state patronage and weakened state institutions. It wields its power disproportionately and flexes its muscle to calibrate how far the “state” is prepared to yield in any negotiations which are meaningless if they do not facilitate hegemony / power retention at all costs.
It fears reform and associates it with a catastrophic loss of power, and thus control. It facilitates the propagation of state business that is inherently beneficial to it, like religiously holding elections to create a veneer or façade of democracy, which is in turn crucial to garnering legitimacy.
The outcome of elections in Zimbabwe is very easy to manipulate. The majority lives in rural areas whilst a sizeable minority lives in major Metropolitan areas and peri-urban centres which are bastions for opposition support.
During elections, riding on the legacy of the brutal war of liberation, massive numbers in rural areas are routinely coerced, commandeered, subjugated or marshalled through a combination of outright violence, duress and patronage systems (food aid) rendered via traditional leaders, War Veterans, ZANU PF Agents and other state and quasi-state agents. These overwhelm any returns from opposition strongholds to deliver “victory”.
A pliant and compromised Judiciary makes challenging the results extremely difficult, and so does limitations in resources and poor strategies and preparation from opposition parties which should ordinarily help to expose these shenanigans.
I can confidently state that during the national elections in 2018, the MDCA was unable to pay and deploy its Polling Agents to all areas across the country in time, which in turn smothered its capacity to provide V11 Forms in support of its Petition in the Constitutional Court.
ED “inherited” the above system in November 2017. He has got a 2/3rds majority in Parliament. Outside of a lack of political will, there is no conceivable reason why he has neglected, failed or refused to introduce reforms. I am certain that he knows about the importance of reforms. This has been confirmed to me by several solid sources, one a senior member in ED’s cabinet and another a senior official in the diplomatic service. Even ED has publicly alluded to this.
Chamisa & the MDCA and critical journalists and other agent provocateurs are “tolerated” by ZANU PF + the Military complex. They do not consider them to be a genuine threat. This is because, the going currency is that change can only be effected by the Military or with the Military’s consent and support.
That is what happens first, followed by choreography / a charade masterfully presented to create a veneer of democratic transition. This applies even in ZANU PF, and is the reason why Bob was toppled by the military and ED was “elected” through a combination of “proclamation” and “affirmation”.
The opposition is “allowed” to participate in elections to help maintain the veneer of democracy. They are “allowed” to demonstrate, hold meetings etc, to the extent that this does not threaten the status quo. As soon as a threat is perceived, disproportionate, “shock and awe”, overwhelming force is unleashed to cower the population into submission.
The opposition’s strongest currency is thus “moral authority”, and windows presented by shifting political sands such as an imploding economy, an unexpected coup, etc. This only works if the world’s eyes are trained on Zimbabwe.
Thabo Mbeki is aware of all the above fundamentals and how the political pendulum swings in Zimbabwe. When the GPA was explored in the aftermath of the April – June 2008 bloodletting, Mbeki was aware of the calamity that was unfolding and wrought on the nation. He was also aware that – that election was a sham. He was also aware that Morgan Tsvangirayi had won the elections.
11. As an electoral force, that was the high watermark for opposition parties in Zimbabwe. They had won the Presidency and scooped the most seats in Parliament.
And YET, despite this, Mbeki protected Bob at the UN and other countless international platforms, showed contempt towards the opposition and strode on the world scene uttering his “there is no crisis” in Zimbabwe notorious & infamous statement. He went on to conspire to deliver what he knew to be a painfully lop sided agreement which did not address the fundamental problems that Zimbabwe was facing, which has brought us full circle, to Mbeki Mac 2.0.
The current envisaged dialogue is taking place when the opposition is at its weakest on the electoral front and ZANU PF and ED are at their strongest. Given the previous outcome, what will change on this latest round? Why would ZANU PF / the Military accept reforms? What would they gain in return? Why now?
Have we seen any objective political indicators showing that they are pivoting towards that? August 1 2018 anyone? January 2019? August 2019? The Kgalema Motlanthe Commission’s Report’s Recommendations anyone?
What about the nature of the current Constitutional Amendments being proposed to do away with Presidential term limits? What bargaining chips does Chamisa bring to the negotiating table following the failed Constitutional Election Petition? At the very least, he will simply be devoured and offered breadcrumbs.
Meanwhile, against all economic and political fundamentals, ZANU PF continues to “win” elections to buttress their position on the legitimacy argument. They invest everything into this, rather than governance to fundamentally weaken the MDC-A’s bargaining position on the point.
Conclusion
I regret to emphatically conclude that even if the opposition operates at its highest and does not make a single political mistake, they will be unable to take over the levers of state power in Zimbabwe. In fact, they should be applauded for soldiering on in what is clearly a harsh and unforgiving environment
Their best option in the calculus is to win elections and then manoeuvre themselves into a position that would enable them to convincingly prove that they have won, and garner local, regional and international support so as to render any attempts at forestalling a transition untenable.
Another option is for them to leverage their “soft power” to maximum effect when events like the 2008 GPA negotiations and the November 2017 negotiations at the time of the coup present themselves.
I hear a lot of folks criticising the opposition for not having pressed the reform mantra more forcefully during the GNU era.
My question is, even if that turned out to be true, realistically speaking, what would they have done to force the issue given that ZANU PF via Prof J Moyo was saying that they would not reform themselves out of power?
Barring the unexpected, the most likely path for Zim is that ED will have two terms, followed by Retired General Chiwenga also serving two terms.
From that point onwards, there is a greater chance that through a combination of mortality and passage of time, sufficient erosion will have taken place to the Party-Military Complex I have referred to above to create the possibility of a more even political playing field in our body politic.
Brighton Mutebuka is a Zimbabwean Lawyer and Solicitor based in the UK. He runs Mutebuka & Co Immigration Lawyers and is an alumni of the University of Zimbabwe and Leeds University’s School of Law. He writes in his personal capacity.