By Takura Zhangazha
When newly re-appointed Finance minister Patrick Chinamasa presented the projected Zimbabwe government budget for 2018 he did not mince his words. Paramount in the intentions of government is the embrace of (neo) liberal economics of the free market with a dash of state capitalism also known as ‘command economy’ (intervention).
It was a budget statement that was received with cautious optimism by those in ‘big business’ and skepticism by those in small ones. For the rest of the public the sentiment is either one of give them a chance to do what they want and see if things improve. Or just downright nonchalance until something actually changes. Either way, the ruling Zanu PF party is well aware of the key challenge of meeting the standard requirement of ‘performance legitimacy’. Both for its supporters and in part in order to win a scheduled harmonised election in 2018.
When the military coup/ intervention occurred on Wednesday 15 November 2017, there was a clear message from its progenitors. It was an act of the guerrilla wing of a former liberation movement (though they may still think it still is). A wing that strongly believes it has a stake in a post independence political arrangement as long as it is alive. And for as long as it could pass on what it has since referred to as ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ to a subsequent generation of young Zimbabweans who would value the same, it is in this for the long haul.
Not only via pushing an appreciation of our national liberation war history and understanding of this military-political complex but also by way of political patronage, a strategy that had been tried by former president Mugabe’s acolytes who had called themselves Generation 40.
The political processes that immediately followed the coup or military intervention no doubt made it a ruling party problem to resolve as it occurred. The Sunday 19 November 2017 Zanu PF central committee meeting that ushered in a new party leader and set the course for his ‘interim presidency’ put paid to any calls for a transitional or unity government in the short term.
The complexity that has however emerged is that of retention of power in the long term. On this the ruling party is going for broke in the wake of its momentous, even popular but evidently undemocratic change of leadership (events/actions).
But the ruling party has a plan. And its a pretty intricate if not disarming one. It has announced a (neo-liberal economic development plan (never mind its insistence on a Robert Mugabe’s ZimAsset economic blueprint). Its promise is to implement the latter better and with a full throttle of macro-economic reforms that are palatable to investor interests. And these include former Rhodesian capital’s interests (if the statements from the special advisor of the ‘new’ president, Christopher Mutsvangwa are anything to go by.
The strategy is probably three pronged. First is to get the economy rejuvenated via a (neo) liberal approach the national economy. That would mean promising to get the government’s game up to scratch with global trends vis-a-vis the free market through pursuing privatization of the state and in order to maintain performance legitimacy through outsourcing the role of the state in keeping with IMF intentions of a not only reduced civil service but also a redundant one.
The second is ensuring a return to political legitimacy and validation of domestic political processes via the long (worn) tradition of the party extraordinary congresses and confirming a presidential candidate in the year preceding elections. All in order that the party and its leadership must demonstrate a popular claim to power. At least internally to the party faithful and significantly to a SADC dominated by former liberation movement governments.
However to effect such an electoral victory in what are tricky and probably ephemeral popular circumstances following the ‘military intervention’ there shall be a (literally) national blitz of ‘command agriculture’ as a means of retaining populist support via patronage and attempts at popular legitimacy.
The third and perhaps most ‘dangerous to democracy’ element is what will occur after securing an electoral ‘victory’ in the 2018 harmonized elections. A new five year term will no doubt give Emerson Mnangagwa the time and opportunity to consolidate what would be a political hold on power as supported by the military-political complex that is the ruling party.
In this there shall be concerted attempts to drown/crowd out opposition voices through dominating the national narrative with economic plans set in neo-liberal frameworks.
Adherence to democratic values such as human rights, public accountability and social service delivery shall be done through the prism of retention of power via performance legitimacy. All with the intention of limiting opportunities for the mainstream or new opposition to regain a national popularity similar to that of the 1990s and the first decade of the millennium . And for this I am certain Zanu PF apparatchiks have closely studied and drawn lessons from their Russian Chinese and probably Angolan, Egyptian and Ethiopian political-military counterparts.
As for the opposition, they are well advised to crosscheck the thoughts of Antonio Gramsci (Selections from the Prison Notebooks) and Amilcar Cabral (Collected Speeches and Writings) even before they dust off Fanon’s ‘Wretched of the Earth’.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)
