Succession race and contested war narratives in Zimbabwean politics

By Alex T. Magaisa

When Emmerson Mnangagwa was asked, in a recent interview, about his chances of succeeding President Robert Mugabe, he was rather nonchalant and dismissive in response.

“You can throw a stone into the yard of the State House when you are on that road [leading to State House], but someone walking from here [Harare] to China will arrive first before you arrive in State House if you are on that road … That is how far it is!” he said.

You can just about imagine him wearing a smirk on his face and, perhaps, a light chuckle at the end. Like many others in Zanu PF, he’s alive to the hazards of expressing ambition or sounding too sure about themselves while the godfather lives.

Besides, there are others with their eye on the throne, too. By his own admission, the road to the highest office in Zimbabwe is not an easy one.

While most people have him as the overwhelming favourite to succeed Mugabe since he ascended to the post of Vice President in December last year, the man himself is well aware that it’s not yet a done deal. If ever he needed any reminding, the wreckage of his predecessor, Joice Mujuru’s ambitions and dreams, is there for him to see.

And so it is that, aware of the dangers of sounding too confident and the folly of declaring his ambitions publicly, the man known as Ngwena, “The Crocodile”, itself a title that suggests menace, is unsurprisingly more guarded. Not that he has a gift with words, no.

In recent months, apart from the fact that his boss remains firmly ensconced in office, with no sign of movement anytime soon, it has become evident that he faces challenges from two fronts. The first is from the bitter quarter of his vanquished adversary, Mujuru, and the second is from old allies within the party, who seem to have turned against him, the so-called G40.

Both sources, for entirely different reasons, seem determined to stand in the way of a long-cherished dream. And something happened earlier this week which represents an ominous signal for Mnangagwa, but also raises an interesting issue in analysing and understanding politics in Zimbabwe: that of competing and contested narratives of liberation war history.

Here, I interrogate this phenomenon, in the context of the succession race so far, and assess its relevance and implications in our politics. Why does it matter? Should it matter?

The “Crocodile Gang” Narrative

Last week, The Daily News led with a story whose principal purpose was to question, throw doubt and discredit Mnangagwa’s war credentials. It was, in essence, a challenge to the narrative of Mnangagwa’s war record, a narrative that has become prominent in recent months.

The received narrative places Mnangagwa as a central member (and in some accounts, as leader) of the famed “Crocodile Gang” which is on record as the first group of nationalist fighters to carry out acts of sabotage in 1964, acts which some have credited as marking the beginnings of the Second Chimurenga.

In this regard, the Crocodile Gang narrative has become a somewhat competing narrative against the commonly-accepted wisdom that places the Battle of Chinhoyi in 1966 as marking the start of the Second Chimurenga.

Proponents of the Crocodile Gang narrative, such as Great Zimbabwe University historian Baxter Tavuyanago, have argued persuasively that it is the Crocodile Gang, and not the Chinhoyi 7, as has been the case, that should be credited with the honour of commencing the liberation struggle in 1964 (see Tavuyanago’s article at https://globaljournals.org/GJHSS_Volume13/4-The-Crocodile-Gang-Operation-A-Critical.pdf)

But the narrative of the Crocodile Gang has attracted greater interest in recent months for three other reasons.

• First, the official narrative includes Mnangagwa as one of its central members and its leader. The fact that Mnangagwa is a presidential aspirant has brought the narrative to the forefront.

• Second, the official narrative has been keenly promoted by Mnangagwa’s team as it seeks to highlight his leadership and heroic role during the liberation war. In this way, the war narrative has been deployed as an instrument to reinforce the validity and legitimacy of Mnangagwa’s claim to the national Presidency. Apart from the regular replays of this narrative in the state media, the National Museums and Monuments has gone further and declared the site where Mnangagwa and his fellow comrade, one Matthew Malowa, allegedly blew up a locomotive as an historical site. A public ceremony was held earlier this year to launch this monument. According to state media, the site was named the ‘Trabablas Trail’ in honour of the name used by Mnangagwa during the war, ‘Trabablas Dzokerai Mabhunu’.

• Third, this official narrative has recently come under challenge, as it does not tally with the received literature on the Crocodile Gang. For example, much of the literature identifies William Ndangana, not Mnangagwa, as the leader of the Crocodile Gang. Some accounts also place Master Tresha, one of the members, as the one who was spared the death penalty because he was under the age of majority. It may be that literature on the Crocodile Gang has gaps or that the official narrative is inaccurate.

Relevance of liberation war narratives

Ironically, the use of liberation war narratives to promote and bolster one’s claim to national leadership is a familiar strategy in Zanu PF politics.

Back in 2004, when Joice Mujuru was being promoted for the Vice Presidency ahead of Mnangagwa, a narrative that hailed her alleged war heroics was constructed and replayed countless times in the state media, to the point that it became accepted as a fact.

The most prominent claim regarding her alleged heroics was that she had single-handedly shot down an enemy helicopter during the war. This war narrative was never questioned within Zanu PF. Not a single person in Zanu PF publicly doubted it.

Instead, it was used by all and sundry to hail her as a great hero of the liberation struggle, with that act being emblematic of her greatness.

Nevertheless, when the time came to eject Mujuru from Zanu PF, the first line of attack was to shoot down this liberation war narrative that had for a long time extolled her heroics and had been accepted as fact.

In an interview with the state media last year, Chris Mutsvangwa, who is now War Veterans Chairman and Minister of War Veterans, said the narrative that Joice Mujuru had shot down a helicopter was a fabrication designed for propaganda purposes.

Later, state media also reported that another female war veteran had claimed that Mujru had “stolen her picture” which was often used to depict Mujuru during combat operations. These images were part of the Mujuru war narrative, designed to bolster her leadership credentials.

But now, led by Mutsvangwa, this new counter-narrative was contesting the official narrative, which ironically Zanu PF and government had relentlessly promoted for many years. This new, competing narrative sought to discredit Mujuru and it was part of the package that eventually led to her downfall.

Thus, what we are observing now, in respect of Mnangagwa, the challenge to his war narrative, is a parallel situation to what we observed in the case of Mujuru. The narrative of the Crocodile Gang is parallel to the narrative of Mujuru downing a helicopter during the war: both were designed to prop up leadership aspirants.

Further, we can also observe that the counter-narrative that is now being constructed to challenge the Mnangagwa narrative is in many ways similar to the counter-narrative that was built up to de-legitimise and invalidate Mujuru’s claims to leadership.

What we see is the continuing relevance of the liberation war narrative in Zanu PF and, by extension, in national politics. The infamous statement by military generals just before the 2002 elections was constructed around the narrative of the liberation war. In a thinly-disguised assault on the opposition, the then Commander of the Defence Forces, General Vitalis Zvinavashe said in a public statement:

“Let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will therefore, not accept, let alone support or salute anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people” 

His successor, General Chiwenga, was even more explicit 6 years later, just before the 2008 elections. What is evident is the centrality of the liberation war narrative, which probably explains the efforts that aspiring candidates go to in constructing narratives of the liberation war that highlight their role and contributions, to the extent sometimes, of straying into exaggerated territory. It would also partly explain the efforts of their detractors to demonstrate the vacuous character of those liberation war narratives.

Against this background, we can see why Mnangagwa’s team has been keen to build the narrative of the Crocodile Gang. But we can also see why his detractors are challenging the validity and authenticity of this narrative.

When the Mujuru narrative was challenged by Chris Mutsvangwa, Mujuru elected not to respond. When a group of war veterans was shipped into an office in a choreographed effort to discredit the narrative, again, Mujuru did not respond. It might be that she did not have a response to the challenges, if the narrative that had been built around her was not based on facts. Or it might be that she had realised by then that it was a pointless fight.

It remains to be seen whether Mnangwagwa will take the Mujuru route of silence or if he will elect to respond and set the record straight.  It is unlikely that he will respond himself, but we might see his lieutenants and minions picking up the pieces and defending his narrative.

It’s yet another episode that demonstrates a major weakness in the historical narrative of Zimbabwean history, and in particular the liberation struggle: there are gaps and in a bid to promote what has been referred to as “patriotic history”, there have also been many omissions and distortions. The object has not been to tell the real story but the story that best extols the virtues of the current leadership.

But before concluding, it is useful to enquire into one last question: what might be the source of the challenge to the Mnangagwa narrative?

Who is discrediting the Mnangagwa war narrative?

There are at least two potential sources: first, the Mujuru camp, who are still bitter after their expulsion from Zanu PF or second, the G40 camp which is allegedly fronted by the “Young Turks” of Zanu PF, among whom are often named, Prof Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwao, among others.

But tempting as it is to credit the G40 with this latest attack, because it is the same tactic that was used against Mujuru, this looks more like it came from the Mujuru end – they are after all the ones who are likely to have war veterans in their ranks, compared to the G40.

Kasukuwere has already angered war veterans, who are not pleased with his alleged description of them as “drunkards”, and it is unlikely they would be fronting his group’s cause.

Mujuru Camp

The Mujuru camp is the one that’s likely to have war veterans challenging the Mnangagwa narrative. The motivation is bitterness and revenge, the idea being that if they can’t have the presidency, then Mnangagwa’s group won’t have it either.

They know that this same tactic was used against them and they would only be giving it back in kind. If they had the audacity to blow up Mujuru’s war narrative, then they are also going to blow Mnangagwa’s narrative.

From the Mujuru camp’s perspective, Mnangagwa had literally snatched the Vice Presidency from her hands. The campaign against her was vicious, brutal and humiliating. Naturally, Mujuru must have felt aggrieved not only by the loss of a lifetime opportunity but also by the manner in which she had lost it. It is therefore conceivable that the assault on the Mnangagwa narrative is coming from the bitter Mujuru camp.

They are signalling that they are not dead and buried yet, as a political force and that they too will use their liberation war experience to contest narratives of the liberation war. In the past, Zanu PF has been able to claim exclusive title to the liberation war narrative, with the opposition parties not being able to provide counter-narratives.

Now however, with liberation veterans now also occupying opposition space, Zanu PF or factions within can expect strong contestations of their narratives from their former allies.  In some ways, it therefore signals a transformation in the ruling party-opposition contestations: the dynamics have changed.

G40 Challenge

The second source of the assault would be the G40, the group of Young Turks in Zanu PF which is supposedly on a mission to stop a Mnangagwa presidency. While they were allies in the campaign to remove Mujuru, it wasn’t long before they started attacking Mnangagwa.

Their theory is that the G40’s mission is to get rid of the older generation of Zanu PF politicians and that the Mujuru ouster was only a first phase of that project. With that section gone, they are now focusing on the remainder, which includes the Mnangagwa faction.

Already, there have been signs of tension between the groups, with recent cabinet reshuffles reflecting the turf wars between the two groups and Mugabe’s efforts to manage them. Prof Moyo, in particular, who was shifted from the information ministry from where he controlled the flow of information, has been throwing several barbs at Mnangagwa through social media, prompting Mnangagwa’s allies to shoot back in retaliation.

Only recently, Mnangagwa’s ally Justice Mayor Wadyajena, a Midlands MP, was reported to have described Moyo as “childish” in reference to alleged attacks on Mnangagwa.

Moyo was quick to respond in kind, saying it was better to be called “childish” than to be known as “murderous”, which observers have interpreted as a subtle reference to Mnangagwa. For a long time, Gukurahundi has been an albatross around Mnangagwa’s neck. He was Minister of State Security at the time.

Before that, Moyo had been quite critical of Mnangagwa after the latter’s statements in an interview with the New African magazine were interpreted to mean he had referred to the late revered Joshua Nkomo as a “sell-out”.

When Moyo appeared in a BBC Hardtalk interview earlier this year, he was less than enthusiastic in his defence of Mnangagwa when questions over his Gukurahundi role were raised.

And when asked about Mnangagwa’s prospects to succeed Mugabe, Moyo was fairly dismissive, arguing that being Vice President was not a guarantee that one would succeed Mugabe and emphasising that, in any event, the Vice Presidency was not an elected position but one by appointment only.

Events in recent months suggest that the G40 appears to have roped in the First Lady, Grace Mugabe as a counter-candidate to thwart Mnangagwa’s ambitions. It does appear that she is being set up either as competition for Mnangagwa or simply to stop his bid for the highest office.

The irony of all this is that it was Grace Mugabe who, less than a year ago, played a critical role in opening Mnangagwa’s path to the Vice Presidency, so much that in public speeches afterwards, Mnangagwa was effusive in praising her for a job well done.

The aggregate effect of all this is that there is serious tension between the two factions in Zanu PF, one backing Mnangagwa and the other, against him.

This internal opposition may well be a source of the narrative gradually chipping away at Mnangagwa’s war narrative which is designed to undermine his credibility as a presidential aspirant and successor to Mugabe.

Conclusion

In the bigger picture, while most have Mnangagwa as the favourite to succeed Mugabe, the fact of the matter is that he has at least two sources of resistance that he must overcome: the ousted former comrades in the Mujuru camp and the internal opponents.

Either or both could be the sources of the counter-narrative that is casting doubts over his war narrative, the purpose of which is to shame and discredit him.

Of wider interest to close watchers of Zimbabwean politics, is the phenomenon of contestation over the narratives of the liberation war. We know that liberation war narratives have always been important in Zanu PF and, by extension, on the national stage.

Aspiring candidates within Zanu PF try to build their liberation war narrative or at least a narrative that speaks to that era. The liberation war narrative seems to be viewed as a tool of validation and legitimation in regard to claims to power at the party and national level. Yet, in efforts to build these narratives, there are risks of exaggerations and distortions.

And, as we have seen, the first line of attack against a presidential aspirant, is often to discredit and invalidate the liberation war narrative. Right now, his detractors have thrown a bomb, trying to blow up the narrative that places Mnangagwa at the centre of the Crocodile Gang. Will he respond? Or will he keep quiet and hope it dies away quietly? Will he be bide his time and hope to strike when the time is appropriate? When he was asked about his nickname, the Crocodile, he gave a typically cryptic response:

“You know the trait of a crocodile, don’t you? It never hunts outside water. It always goes into the water to catch its prey. It never goes in the villages or in the bush looking for food. It strikes at the appropriate time”.

It remains to be seen whether that “appropriate time” will come for the Crocodile. For now, his detractors have thrown a hard jab, not enough to fell a man, but one whose force cannot be ignored.

 

This article was first published on www.alexmagaisa.com Follow on Twitter @wamagaisa  Contact at [email protected]