Imagining Zimbabwe’s future without Mugabe (Part 3)

By Alex T. Magaisa

In the last two articles, we observed how Mugabe manoeuvred his way to become the embodiment of Zanu PF, a feat that he also tried on the national stage, with a great measure of success, as he assumed total control and stamped his personality upon the Zimbabwean state.

We were trying, in those two articles, to imagine the future of both Zanu PF and Zimbabwe without Mugabe, by reflecting upon his rise and how he had created an intricate system based on politics of patronage to sustain his long reign.

The object of all this was that by understanding what he has done to Zanu PF and the state, we might be able to imagine what both might look like in a future without him.

Having achieved that, it is plain that his inevitable departure will create a great chasm, the implications of which will be profound for both party and country.

This then, leads us to the final point of enquiry in this three-part series of articles, which is: can Zanu PF survive, as we have known it, after Mugabe has vacated the stage? The answer to this question turns on a number of factors.

Here, I have selected key factors which include: the successor’s ability to command loyalty among the party’s key groups, institutional strength, persuasiveness of ideological and policy positions, the protection of political rent-seekers’ interests and Mugabe’s role in the transition.

Over-dependence on Mugabe

While tight control and total domination of the party have served Mugabe well throughout his long tenure, it evidently came with a significant price tag for the party. It is that over the years, the party appears to have become too dependent on its leader.

In a party of various factional interests jostling and colliding in the background, Mugabe is the adhesive element that has kept them together. He is listened to and obeyed by his lieutenants, who compete to outdo each other in the social enterprise of praise-singing. He wields great authority and commands loyalty from his troops, of the kind that would make military generals envious.

Even the more ambitious ones, like Eddison Zvobgo, who declined to campaign for him in the 2002 Presidential elections, ultimately, never gathered the courage to challenge or condemn him, their disaffection towards his rule and their demotion from high political office notwithstanding.

And whenever a Zanu PF politician is accused of some offence, his or her first line of defence is a pledge of abundant loyalty to Mugabe, as if that washes away all political sin but such is the leader’s power and centrality in the party’s politics. It is this that gives rise to the question as to how Zanu PF will cope without its most central figure, one view being that things are likely to fall apart, once this centre ceases to hold.

Already, the signs are not looking good. It has become evident in recent years that beyond the façade of a united party, lie great rivalries and petty jealousies between factions, propelled by the ambition to succeed Mugabe. The only point of unity at present is the patriarch himself, but even so, the bonds of unity are loosening and threatening to give way.

That Mugabe has been at the helm for nearly 40 years, means for an entire generation in Zanu PF, leadership transition is a completely new phenomenon. The last such transition occurred in the 1975–77 period, when Mugabe himself replaced Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole as President of Zanu, in what was, in effect, a “soft coup” represented most iconically by the famous Mgagao Declaration of 1975, issued by a group of guerrilla commanders.

After expressing great disaffection with Sithole, the guerrilla commanders made a clear preference for Mugabe as the chosen one, and from there, he never looked back. He would have struggled to command the military side if he had not received their backing. As we shall see, this military factor is still important in Zanu PF politics and may yet play a decisive role in the transition from the Mugabe era.

Institutional Strength

One of the key features determining a party’s ability to outlive its leader is the strength and durability of its institutions. Where institutions are strong and independent, there is a good facility for perpetual succession, compared to where institutions are intimately tied to the individual leader. Where loyalty to the leader stands ahead of loyalty to the institutions, once the leader vacates, the institutions are likely to suffer.

We have already observed that an important feature of Mugabe’s reign has been the centralisation and personalisation of power, which has enabled him to leave a strong imprint of his personality upon the state, the party and its institutions.

His longevity in power is tied to his ability to command respect, affection and even fear, among leaders and members of state institutions. The generous powers of appointment have helped him to create a delicate system of patronage in which as chief patron, he enjoys total loyalty and obedience of all who serve at his pleasure.

The person who comes after Mugabe will have to bank on winning the loyalty, not of institutions but of individual members and leaders of those institutions.

Loyalty Factor

This means a new leader must have the capacity, like Mugabe, to command the respect and loyalty of individual members in the critical parts of “The System” that sustains Zanu PF. I have previously written at length on the notion of “The System” http://alexmagaisa.com/understanding-the-system-in-zimbabwean-politics/ It is important to understand the critical parts of “The System” and how it operates on the Zimbabwean political landscape.

“The System” is an intricate web of political and non-political actors, which includes the war veterans, women, youths, traditional leaders, business leaders, civil service and, crucially, the securocrats within the security establishment. These groups have been critical to Mugabe’s sustained rule and dominance over the last 40 years.

The party’s women and youth wings have been the critical drivers of his political campaigns, along with the war veterans.  The security establishment has also been critical in maintaining Mugabe’s authority. It is widely believed that it was the securocrats who rescued Mugabe in 2008 after his defeat to Tsvangirai in the March 29 elections.

The role of the military in Zanu PF politics has historical roots and is not always properly understood in the assessment of Zimbabwean politics. Writing in the Encyclopaedia Britannica 1982, Mugabe recounts how the military factor became influential in Zanu PF politics. Describing how the military got a role in the political wing of the party at the special meeting where he was elected in 1977, Mugabe said,

“For the first time, several members of the ZANLA high command were now also members of the Central Committee so that they too could participate in the policy-making function of the party”

Mugabe’s own rise to power was strengthened by the backing he got from the guerrilla commanders who issued the Mgagao Declaration and the subsequent endorsement by the Dare reChimurenga (War Council).

This close engagement between the military and political wings of the party continued after independence, particularly with senior members serving in the military being veterans of the liberation war. In addition retired senior members of the military were deployed into civilian institutions of the state.

The relationship is so close that the defence forces are to Zanu PF today what liberation armies, Zanla and Zipra were to Zanu and Zapu respectively, during the war. As if to confirm their substantial influence in Zanu PF politics, Vice President and presidential aspirant, Emmerson Mnangagwa introduced the Defence Forces chief at a party rally this year as the “real political commissar of Zanu PF”.

The point here is that whoever receives the favour and backing of the security establishment in the succession battle will have a big advantage over his or her rivals and greater prospects of holding things together. But it would be presumptuous, of course, to assume that the securocrats themselves are or will be united in their vision of Zanu PF and Zimbabwe in a post-Mugabe era, let alone the choice of successor.

The unity thus far displayed is masked by the show of loyalty to Mugabe.  Already, the media has insinuated that there are divisions in the security establishment, with a silent group that is said to sympathetic to former Vice President Joice Mujuru, who was ousted last year. Some reports also suggest that senior members of the security establishment may have their own personal ambitions to take over and the rush to earn academic titles among securocrats is a relevant consideration in this regard.

There is therefore, no guarantee that the façade of unity and loyalty to the political leadership among the securocrats will continue in a post-Mugabe era. It is this that gives rise to the spectre of chaos. In future, I intend to address this, what I have called the “Chaos Theory” in Zanu PF’s succession politics.

Ideology and Policy

Another factor that is usually critical in sustaining a political party beyond its leader is the strength and persuasiveness of its ideological position and policies. If a party has a strong and persuasive ideological position and robust policies, then it would stand a good chance of outliving the leader.

Any person who subscribes to the same ideological line and policies will still be able to lead a strong party. But all this depends on whether the party actually has a strong and persuasive ideological line and policies. Although there are certain features that define the Mugabe era, it is not easy to identify a firm ideological line.

There was a time when Zanu PF dabbled in socialist ideology, in the early days of independence. We saw how the 1984 congress mandated Zanu PF to pursue a Marxist-Leninist approach and to establish a one-party government.

Nevertheless, this was later abandoned in 1990, amid internal resistance and the collapse of communism in the Eastern Bloc. Nevertheless, even before that, the government had been ambivalent in its ideological approach. As Mugabe himself wrote in 1982, 

“Upon the attainment of independence, however, the government made it clear that its programs would occur in a socio-economic context in which the historical, traditional, and objective circumstances of the country were recognised. Outright nationalisation of the various sectors is not a feasible proposition, given the lack of technology, managerial skills, business experience and even ideological consciousness among the majority of the people”

These were words of a pragmatist despite the socialist rhetoric. In any event, while the 1984 congress adopted a new Leadership Code, which set very strict rules of property ownership by leaders, among other stern prohibitions, no one took it seriously. Indeed, senior leaders both in the party and the military went on to acquire assets and had become very wealthy by the end of the first decade of independence.

Indeed, the infamous Willowgate Scandal in 1998, exposed gross levels of corruption by politicians, senior government officials and businessmen. Maurice Nyagumbo, tasked after the 1984 congress with administering the Leadership Code, committed suicide when he was caught up in the scandal which involved the purchase of motor vehicles at low prices using a government facility for re-sale at ridiculously high prices.

After the failure of the dalliance with socialist ideology, Mugabe’s government went neo-liberal, with the adoption of the IMF-recommended Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the early 1990s. This too failed and was abandoned but critics charge that it was because Mugabe’s government had been half-hearted about it in the first place. Whoever comes after Mugabe will have his work cut out in terms of establishing a firm ideological stand-point. 

Policies

Nevertheless, there are 3 key policies that have defined the Mugabe era, especially in the latter years of his rule:

• The first is the land reform policy which has had persuasive appeal among voters, particularly in the rural areas, which host the majority of voters. Mugabe’s successor will maintain a strong position on the land issue, but he or she will have to take bold steps to improve and promote land use and productivity.

• The second is indigenisation of businesses whose philosophy, like land reform, also has persuasive appeal among the core group of Zanu PF supporters and others beyond. However, because it presents problems for the country’s bid to attract foreign investment, a successor will have to be pragmatic and adaptable.

• The third is his anti-West policy whose ‘B’ side is the Look East policy in the conduct of foreign and economic affairs. Mugabe has pursued a highly antagonistic line against the Western countries which have also responded in kind and while his stance has earned him great appeal among the Pan-Africanists across the world, it has also resulted in Zimbabwe’s isolation. On the other hand, he has pursued a Look East policy, with a strong preference on building a relationship with China. It hasn’t brought much success and most people have questioned the wisdom of this policy. In more recent years, even his Finance Minister, Patrick Chinamasa, has gone to great lengths to romance the West, in particular the IMF, with a view to re-engagement.

The dire state of the economy suggests that Mugabe’s ideological standpoint and policies have largely been disastrous. Yet it is also fair to say policies like land reform and indigenisation have also won him admirers and loyalty among Zanu PF supporters.

They have persuasive appeal in a country that still has memories of racial discrimination and marginalisation during the colonial era. For this reason, a successor who upholds these party policies will earn the loyalty and respect of the core group of party supporters.

Protection political rent-seekers’ 

Another important factor determining stability after the Mugabe era is the successor’s ability and willingness to protect interests of the beneficiaries of Mugabe’s rule – the political rent-seeking class.

The reign of Mugabe has been characterised by an escalation of corruption of the state and its institutions, which have provided innumerable rent-seeking opportunities from the political class. The System that Mugabe has created and thrived upon consists of numerous groups that have stakes and businesses in various parts of the economy, often linked to the state and its institutions – these constitute the political rent-seeking class.

To this class of people, the state presents vast rent-seeking opportunities. The state is the primary agency through which they amass wealth through wages, benefits and allowances, through contracts, business deals and numerous other opportunities for making vast amounts of money. These political rent-seekers, whose sole purpose is to prey upon the state and its institutions, have become extraordinarily wealthy.

While the majority of Zimbabweans have fallen into the abyss and are wallowing in poverty, political rent-seekers have used their proximity to the state to amass incredible amounts of wealth. Their defence of the Zanu PF regime is, in effect, a defence of these rent-seeking opportunities.

For them, all they want is continuity in the post-Mugabe era. They want someone who will protect their wealth and opportunities. This is their major pre-occupation. This is why, even when there are clear divisions in Zanu PF, they will often close ranks when faced with serious threats to the party’s stranglehold on the state and power. They will suspend their mutual hatred and work towards the common goal of keeping power.

Aspiring successors to Mugabe’s reign simply have to gain the trust and confidence of the rent-seeking class. It is this aspect, the closing of ranks by the rent-seeking class in and around Zanu PF, that might just help the party to survive beyond the Mugabe era.

The corollary is that if a potential successor threatens, or is perceived to be a threat to, the wealth and opportunities of some in the political rent-seeking class, then there will be serious problems for the party. The candidate will not only be opposed but the other factions may play Bhora Musango politics (Kicking the ball into the long grass), which means they will not support him or her in a national election. If they lose, Zanu PF may not survive as an opposition party. It would take an awfully long time for it to recover.

Can Zanu PF survive as the formidable unit that it has been over the years, without its godfather? His long reign might have benefitted him but it may also have left the party perilously dependent upon him such that when he departs, unless they close ranks in defence of their wealth, the party may find life without its Capo quite tricky.

In Mafia parlance, he’s the godfather who has kept the Zanu Family tight and together. Finding the new godfather, however, will not be easy and with him gone, the Zanu Family may struggle to keep together.

As current godfather however, Mugabe has one way to minimise the risk: if he takes the approach of organised succession, where he has a hand in picking a successor and lending him his considerable weight before he eventually bows out.

It won’t solve all the problems for the would-be successor, but it will, at least, give him or her a stable start. But that’s a subject for another day, when we shall discuss the “Chaos Theory” in the succession drama.

This article was first published on www.alexmagaisa.com Follow on Twitter @wamagaisa  Contact at [email protected]