Will Mujuru make a difference in Zimbabwe’s opposition?

By Alex T. Magaisa

The recent announcement by Joice Mujuru of her re-entry into Zimbabwean politics following an inglorious exit from Zanu PF earlier this year, has generated a great amount of debate among Zimbabweans.

In the last blog, I presented a critical appraisal of her proposed party’s manifesto, the agency by which she announced her re-appearance after a period of political hibernation in the wake of her inglorious departure from the ruling party.

But now that she has played her card, what are her chances? Will she make any difference to what has been a tireless and valiant but so far fruitless and frustrating effort by Zimbabwe’s opposition to dislodge Zanu PF from power?

Does she bring anything new and useful to the table? Or is it another exercise in futility, a sudden gust of wind that announces its brief moment of fury by blowing off a few thatched roofs, before retiring into a harmless waft?

These are some of the many questions that Zimbabweans are asking. They are legitimate enquiries. Here, in pursuit of a more even perspective, I look at the case for and against Mujuru on the Zimbabwean political landscape – factors on her side and those that disfavour her. I conclude with an argument that I have advanced before, in anticipation of her re-entry, that the most significant impact would be the convergence of opposition forces.

I will start with the case against Mujuru and then proceed to the case in her favour.

The Case against Mujuru

Old Wine in New Bottles?

Sceptics say Mujuru and her team bring nothing new to the table, that if anything, they are no more than the proverbial old wine in new bottles, same stuff in a new package. Makudo ndimamwe, hakuna risina mahobi, in the wisdom of the elders, literally translated, baboons are all the same, they all have long foreheads.

This is what critics say, that these are just frustrated people whose political DNA has the indelible marks of Zanu PF. They say they are too stuck in their old ways and can’t let go, so much that when rumours of the new outfit first emerged earlier this year, some among their number were intent upon calling it Zanu PF, with the PF denoting “People First”, rather than the Patriotic Front of their erstwhile party.

And even now, while they have reluctantly shed off the “Zanu” part of that identity, and called themselves People First, they have still retained the PF initials, betraying a longing for their old home, with which deep down, they still identify.

They talk about challenging the “post-congress Zanu PF”, language suggesting that their opposition is not against Zanu PF, but a face of Zanu PF in which they have been excluded. In their minds, there is an “original Zanu PF” with which they identify.

Yet, oblivious to them, this “original Zanu PF” is the same outfit that people in opposition, whom they hope to woo, have been fighting for the past decade and half. These lingering spots of Zanu PF residue in their mentality do little to inspire confidence.

Sceptics holding this damning view see nothing new or democratic coming from the outfit, whose purpose, they argue, is motivated by vengeance against old comrades who authored their political misfortunes. They are part of the old generation – Mutasa himself, one of Mujuru’s closest allies, is an octogenarian, the same age around which a decade ago, opposition supporters were saying Mugabe was too old to lead.

While Mujuru herself is of much younger stock, another close warrior, Rugare Gumbo is not far behind Mutasa. They can hardly use the age argument against Mugabe or even his potential successor Mnangagwa, without sounding hypocritical.

If Mugabe is too old to bring anything fresh to government, it is hard to see how his own contemporaries, in age and politics, can be part of anything better. They were in government for more that three decades. This old generation must give way to a new generation of leaders, critics argue.

Replication of opposition policies?

Looking at the manifesto recently presented by Mujuru, there is much that is in common with the existing opposition’s policies. The MDC’s JUICE and ART policy documents, which anchored their 2013 election campaign were based on a similar market-driven ideology and policies – limited role of the state as facilitator and regulator, pro-capital and investor friendly, review and reform (read repeal) of indigenisation policies, property rights protection, review of land policy, privatisation, liberal democracy and human rights, etc.

What is evident is that there is convergence in the language and ideas of the MDC and the proposed People First. Critics say the MDC manifesto failed, a circumstance which they say consigns the Mujuru outfit’s manifesto to a similar fate. But this, of course, is too simplistic, premised as it is, on a belief that manifestos actually make a difference in voters’ choices, a belief that is challenged by some observers of Zimbabwean politics.

It could be, as is argued by the opposition in defence, that elections in Zimbabwe do not allow people to make free choices and that their failure to win elections is explained not by the weaknesses of their manifestos but by the absence of an environment that supports free and fair elections. But still, the question for Mujuru would be whether she has the key to the logjam that has prevented the MDC from claiming victory?

Capacity to take power?

Critics say, unless Mujuru’s outfit has the tools to facilitate power transfer, its entrance into the political arena ultimately amounts to nothing of significance. They argue that the problem of the opposition parties is not that they have failed to win elections, but that instead, they have failed to take power.

They point to the 2008 elections in particular, when Morgan Tsvangirai beat Robert Mugabe in the first round of elections but it had taken an inordinate and suspicious delay of up to six weeks before the results were announced.

The opposition has always suspected that the delay was used to manipulate the results to prevent power transfer and to give Mugabe a second chance at the ballot box. Critics argue that Mugabe and Zanu PF used their control of state and electoral machinery to prevent power transfer, even though the opposition had won.

But for its part, the opposition is not spared criticism for failing to claim and defend its victory. Critics say, the MDC’s shortcoming has not been a failure to win elections but a failure to claim and defend victory when they should have.

What is it that the Mujuru outfit can do to plug this weakness in the opposition? Does Mujuru and her team have what it takes to do what the existing opposition have failed and ensure there is a system that delivers a free and fair election and a credible and legitimate outcome? If they do not have answers, they would be no better than the exisiting opposition.

Conduct inconsistent with policy propositions

Other say while the manifesto makes good reading, the sweet promises and propositions are not consistent with previous conduct.

Mujuru talks of freedoms and private property but back in 1998, critics remind her, she nearly scuttled the establishment of what would go on to become one of Zimbabwe’s top businesses, the conglomerate and economic giant that is now Econet.

At the time, she was the Information Minister, in charge of the licensing process but took a position that nearly blocked Econet, which had to get a licence through a decision of the Supreme Court.

This was the episode that sparked the infamous insult against Joshua Nkomo, of whom she is alleged to have referred to as a “senile old man” when he tried to support Masiyiwa’s bid for a licence. People look at this and say this conduct is not consistent with what is set out in the manifesto.

There is also no doubt that Mujuru is of wealthy stock, so wealthy that she could afford to spurn her constitutional pension and benefits. People say Zanu PF is thoroughly corrupt, and they accuse the leaders of having looted the state over the years.

Back in 1997, a Commission of Inquiry found out that the War Victims Compensation Fund, a compensation and welfare fund for veterans of the liberation war had been abused.

Top government officials had claimed huge compensation packages, based on deliberately fudged medical tests that stated they had suffered damages in the over 90 per cent range. Mujuru was among the beneficiaries, with a 55% certification of disability.

For perspective, the late Chenjerai Hunzvi, head of the war veterans association at the time claimed he was 117% disabled while the late Reward Marufu, the First Lady’s brother, was certified at 95% disabled. However ridiculous these amounts were found to be, not a single person paid back a penny.

Previous conduct, critics argue, is inconsistent with the sweet language contained in the manifesto.  It is important to answer these questions to gain public trust.

A Mujuru Party?

The weakness of opposition parties, critics have said in the past, is that they are built around individuals; that they are too personalised and revolve around the agency of one person. That person then becomes the proverbial face of the party without whom it struggles to exist. People cannot see it beyond the individual leader.

In this regard, the new outfit has taken a familiar path. It looks like a Mujuru party and sounds like a Mujuru party. That cannot be a good sign. They ought to move quickly to exorcise this ghost, because it will haunt the party. 

Zanu PF’s Trojan Horse?

Finally, even though there is no evidence that she was complicit in her sacking from Zanu PF, and even though her dismissal was both so public and humiliating, that she could not have had a hand in it, there are still sceptics who actually believe that Mujuru is part of a sophisticated scheme by Zanu PF to split the opposition vote.

They say Zanu PF is adept at using these “divide and rule” tactics and point to Dr Simba Makoni, whom, some still insist, was similarly deployed to split the opposition vote in the 2008 elections. They believe that in the same way, Mujuru is the proverbial Trojan Horse, sent by Zanu PF to destroy the opposition from within.

This view may be completely misguided and without reason or foundation, fuelled probably by paranoia, but Mujuru will need to assuage the fears of those that hold it. Taking it for granted would be a mistake.

The Case for Mujuru

The new Joice – a victim who has changed?

Those sympathetic to Mujuru say, a person who realises the error of their ways and joins the cause for reform ought to be welcomed and given a chance to prove herself. She who is not against us is with us, they believe.

Critics, however, dismiss the view that she has changed and say, after all, she never left Zanu PF voluntarily, and that had she not been sacked, she would still be a happy member of the gravy train.

But supporters say, look at the reason for her sacking from Zanu PF – it was because she is a reformist and was always a closet sympathiser of the opposition. They say look at her GNU record, where she was civil towards the MDC coalition partners, when her Zanu PF colleagues were hostile.

Mujuru is also benefiting from the sympathy at the way she was treated by Zanu PF, and in particular her brutal persecution at the hands of the President’s wife, Grace Mugabe. People did not just see a Vice President being attacked mercilessly but also a widow and a grandmother being put through the mill in a brutal fashion by a fellow woman.

She was dignified in her response, which won her respect and sympathy even among erstwhile opponents and critics. People sympathise with victims, especially victims of Zanu PF. Most opposition supporters have witnessed the same treatment, upon themselves or their friends and relatives, and they identify with the persecuted.

Suspicions that her husband, the respected late General Solomon Mujuru, may have been the victim of an assassination, rather than an accidental fire, also bring some sympathy. Mujuru has benefitted from this flood of sympathy, arising from the perception of victimhood at the hands of Zanu PF.

Pentiti – they who have repented

In criminal world of the Mafia, when a person renounces his/her criminal past, and starts collaborating with the authorities in the prosecution of erstwhile colleagues, the Mafia bosses, that person is called  Pentito – he/she who has repented, Pentiti, when they are more than one. Law enforcement authorities find much use in Pentiti.

After all, they are the people who have the know-how of the criminal underworld operations. The rationale is that in order to break the Mafia, you need to work with former members of the Mafia who know how it works.

This is the analogy that best describes the view of those who think Mujuru and her colleagues might be of use in opposition, after spending much of their lives in Zanu PF, until their recent unceremonious exit. They say they have repented and they are our political equivalent of the Pentiti.

They provide the ingredient that has been missing in the opposition recipe.  They know Zanu PF well, how it operates, how it runs elections and how it retains power and thwarts the opposition.  They probably have their own people within the structures of the state and the party, even though they are out of government.

When you want to catch a thief, sometimes it helps, they say, to send a thief in pursuit. He knows where to look and how to catch the thief because he is familiar with the tricks of the trade. Mujuru and company were part of the Zanu PF machinery that presided over the discredited electoral system. They know how it works; how it’s done and they can use their knowledge to help prevent irregularities. This is the view, or more specifically, the hope, that is held by sympathisers.

But, ultimately, a Pentito has to prove that she is truly a Pentito – that he/she has really repented. Only then can she gain public trust that she is genuine.

Frustration with the existing opposition

But why have former Zanu PF senior members, with all the murky history behind them attracted so much interest even among opposition supporters? While most people sympathise with the opposition, some have grown frustrated by its failure to overcome Zanu PF since 1999.

This is despite the fact that people know that taking power from the founding ruling party is typically a long and arduous process in most African countries. These frustrations have led to disaffection which has manifested in splits within the original MDC, which now appears in various formations.  There has also been a mushrooming of small political parties from disaffected former members.

There is a feeling in some circles that the existing opposition has failed in its mission and that there is need for something new, with fresh ideas and strategies on how to dislodge Zanu PF from power and take the country in a new direction.

Mujuru is a beneficiary of this general disaffection with the current opposition. She may be part of the old Zanu PF, others say recycled and probably tired, but to some, she brings a new dimension to the opposition.

But all this may be based on no more than wishful thinking, on a desperate desire to clutch onto anything that promises hope. Mujuru will need to use the opportunity quickly as the benefit of the doubt that she enjoys among sympathisers won’t last for too long.

Dividing Zanu PF?

While Zanu PF prefers to portray the view that Mujuru’s political outfit damages the opposition more than them, its critics believe that in fact, it represents a division of the old ruling party, a circumstance which they believes stands to give an advantage to the opposition, as the strength of Zanu PF has traditionally been in its unity.

Zanu PF has had problems since its formation in 1963, but it has not suffered a seismic shift like the one believed to be happening since the last Congress in December 2014. Over the course of the year, Zanu PF expelled or suspended a large number of its leaders in the structures of the party, all of them suspected to have been aligned to Mujuru.

During her tenure as Vice President, as she prepared to succeed Mugabe, Mujuru had built a loyal following and had placed loyalists in strategic positions within the party. All these people have since been punished in various ways by Zanu PF. If, as expected, they follow her to her new party, along with their supporters, this will represent a significant rupture in the ruling party of a magnitude that has not been seen before.

This would impact on the solidity and power of Zanu PF and its traditional dominance in the rural areas. If Mujuru’s party can take a significant chunk of the rural vote that Zanu PF has traditionally relied upon, this will change the political landscape in an important way.

Further, developments in Zanu PF after her departure demonstrate that all is not well in the ruling party. Those who were united in her persecution and dismissal now seem to be fighting each other, further dividing the party.

All this could work to her advantage, exploiting the internal divisions and disaffection within Zanu PF.  If the warring factions that have remained in Zanu PF decide to play Bhora Musango (Kicking the ball to the long grass) against each other, it’s Mujuru and the opposition who may benefit.

Conclusion

Ultimately, there are weighty factors on both sides of the debate. There are factors that favour Mujuru and others against her. The question is how she maximises on the favourable factors and minimises the harm of the factors against her.

If there is one thing that she has, which the existing opposition has lacked, it is that no-one can use the exclusionary argument that she did not fight the war. Her Lib-cred (liberation credentials) are intact. She also brings to the table a wealth of knowledge of the state and how it works, especially over elections. Zanu PF has never had to deal with an opposition that knows the system so well.

But whatever her strengths, ultimately, the plain fact that must be understood at the outset is that Mujuru will not do it alone. She will need the other opposition leaders and their parties. Only a credible coalition will pose a significant challenge to Zanu PF.

For its part, because they know the threat posed by a coalition, Zanu PF will be working hard to foment friction and conflict between the parties, especially between Mujuru and Tsvangirai, whose coalition might represents the greatest chance for the opposition in Zimbabwe.

It bodes well for a coalition that Tsvangirai’s response to her entrance has been civil and mature. The opposition will have to be pragmatic if they are to stand a chance. Bury their egos, and the echoes of success will not be far-fetched.

This article was first published on www.alexmagaisa.com Follow on Twitter @wamagaisa  Contact at [email protected]