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Zimbabwe News and Internet Radio

Zimbabwe now a Coconut Republic

By Dr. George Ayittey and Denford Madenyika

While the Movement for Democratic Change has decided to concentrate all their efforts on the appointments of Gideon Gono as the Reserve Bank Governor and Johannes Tomana as the Attorney General, Mugabe is refusing to call for any by-election.

The Zimbabwean Constitution is clear on when a vacant Parliamentary seat must be filled. This failure by Mugabe to call for elections to fill the vacant seats makes all Members of Parliament lack legal mandates to execute their duties as legal Representatives of the Zimbabwean constituents.

How do you explain a system where more than 10 Constituents are not represented in Parliament yet laws that affect them are passed daily?

Well, as they say, the vampire state does not care about nor represent the people. It sucks the economic vitality out of the people.  Eventually, however, it metastasizes into a coconut republic and implodes.

The implosion nearly always begins with a dispute over the electoral process: A refusal to hold elections or the results of outrageously rigged elections. Blockage of the democratic process or the refusal to hold elections plunged Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, and Sudan into civil war.

Hard-liner manipulation of the electoral process destroyed Rwanda (1993), Sierra Leone (1992) and Zaire (1990). Subversion of the electoral process in Liberia (1985) eventually set off a civil war in 1989.

The same type of subversion instigated civil strife in Cameroon (1991)  , Congo (1992), Kenya (1992), Togo (1992) and Lesotho (1998). In Congo (Brazzaville), a dispute over the 1997 electoral framework flared into mayhem and civil war.

Finally, the military’s annulment of electoral results by the military started Algeria’s civil war (1992) and plunged Nigeria into political turmoil (1993).

The political crisis starts when public furor, protests and violence erupt over election disputes. A gaggle of politicians and stake-holders scramble to resolve the crisis. They talk endlessly. The country is paralyzed. Frustrations mount. Several scenarios become possible.

Opposition leaders may be bought off and co-opted to join the errant regime. A “government of national unity” may be attempted. But even before the ink on the agreement is dry, squabbles erupt over the distribution of ministerial positions.

Neither side is satisfied with what they get nor do hostilities resume. The regime may resort to brutal repression of the opposition (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Zimbabwe) or even extermination with the macabre logic that if the opposition doesn’t exist, then there would be no one to share power with (Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan).

But sooner or later, the people come to see through the political chicanery and posturing. The public loses faith in the electoral process and the ability of politicians to resolve the crisis. Some group then decides it is no use talking and the only way to remove the tyrant in power is by force.

The group then takes “to the bush” and that is how nearly all rebel insurgencies start in Africa. Charles Taylor of Liberia launched his rebel insurgency in 1989 after losing faith in the ability of the then president, General Samuel Doe, and opposition leaders, Gabriel Baccus Matthews and Amos Sawyer to resolve it.

Similarly, Laurent Kabila of Zaire (now DRC) took up arms in 1996. It only takes a small band of determined rebels to start an insurgency, wreak mayhem and utter destruction. Yoweri Museveni, now president of Uganda, started out with only 27 men, Charles Taylor of Liberia with less than 200 and Laurent Kabila with about 150.

The insurgency, always mounted by politically-marginalized or excluded groups, always starts from the countryside. Rebels don’t set out to redraw artificial colonial boundaries. Nor does ethnicity have anything to do with the insurgency. Somalia is ethnically homogenous; yet it imploded.

The insurgency is about capturing POWER, so the rebels head straight towards the capital, where political power resides. Along the way, they pick up recruits and their ranks swell with unemployed youth (child soldiers). Government soldiers, sent to crush the rebels, often defect, bringing along their valuable weapons (Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zaire).

Eventually the despot flees into exile (Generals Mobutu Sese Seko, General Siad Barre, General Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone) or is killed (General Samuel Doe, General Juvenal Habryimana).

Since 1990, one African country after another has imploded with deafening staccato:

·   In 1990, Liberia was destroyed by the regime of General Samuel Doe,
·   In 1991, Mali by the regime of General Moussa Traore,
·   In 1993, the Central African Republic was destroyed by the military regime ofGeneral Andre Kolingba,
·   In 1993, Somalia was ruined by the regime of General Siad Barre,
·   In 1994, Rwanda by the regime of General Juvenal Habryimana,
·   In 1995, Burundi by the regime of General Pierre Buyoya,
·   In 1996, Zaire by regime of General Mobutu Sese Seko,
·   In 1997, Sierra Leone by regime of General Joseph Momoh,
·   In 1999, Niger by the regime of General Ibrahim Barre Mainassara,
·   In 2000, Ivory Coast by the regime of General Robert Guei.
·   In 2005, Togo by the regime of General Gnassingbe Eyadema.

Note the frequency of the title “General”. Now, in Zimbabwe, the Joint Operation Command” (JOC) that is in charge comprise of these military generals: Chiwenga, Shiri, and Sibanda. It is déjà vu all over again.

Military generals have left a trail of plunder, wanton destruction and human debris across post colonial Africa. They did a number on Nigeria. Between 1970 and 2004, more than $450 billion in oil revenue flowed into Nigerian government coffers.

But, according to Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, former chief of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigeria’s military rulers stole $412 billion of the oil money.  Like their counterparts in Myammar (Burma), you can’t reason with military generals.

They are not trained to compromise; a political necessity. They are programmed to destroy and they believe that every economic and social problem can be solved with the application of sufficient force, which has destroyed many economies and countries in Africa.

Said Chuba Okadigbo, former chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of Nigeria’s dissolved Senate: “I believe the worst form of civilian government is better that the most benevolent military regime” (The New York Times, Dec 2, 1993; p.A3). Former Nigerian president, General Ibrahim Babangida would agree. He once said that all military regimes are a fraud. He should know that.

Zimbabwe is currently at this stage of the implosion process: Mass suffering, mass emigration (over 4 million Zimbabweans have fled the country), complete break-down of the electoral process, total lack of faith in the political leadership, both government and the opposition, seizure of power by military generals, and catastrophic failure of regional and continental leadership. The options available for peaceful resolution of Zimbabwe’s crisis have rapidly evaporated and the window of opportunity has closed.

The first option is the “government of national unity or healing” (GNU), which was adopted by Kenya after its recent violent elections in Dec 2007. It is a flawed concept which has never worked in any African country in recent times.

It failed in Angola, Ivory Coast, Liberia, South Africa and Sudan. The basic reason is that, after protracted negotiations, neither side is satisfied with the government positions they get. Incessant squabbles erupt and the rebels may threaten to “return to the bush.”

To appease them, new and meaningless cabinet positions may be created, leading to a massive swell of the state bureaucracy. Kenya now has at least 90 cabinet ministers and deputy ministers.

 In the case of Zimbabwe, it is unlikely the military generals, who vowed they will never accept an MDC electoral victory, would enter into “power-sharing” or “unity” talks with the opposition. Again, military generals do not compromise.

Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the opposition, after being brutalized and their ranks decimated, would join the Mugabe regime in a government of national unity. In fact, Morgan Tsvangirai has already rejected a junior position in such a government. The late Joshua Nkoma made such a mistake by joining the Mugabe regime in 1987 and was marginalized.

The second option is the “sovereign national conference” (SNC). It is premised on the realization that the crisis in Zimbabwe is beyond the capability of Mugabe and Tsvangirai to resolve by themselves and it must take all Zimbabweans to resolve. The vehicle for doing this is SNC. It is based on the African institution of “village meeting.”  

When a crisis erupts in an African village, the chief will convene a village meeting, where the people debated the issue until they came to a consensus. Once reached, everybody in the village, including the chief, was required to abide by it, Hence, the term “sovereign.”

In recent years, this indigenous African tradition was revived by pro-democracy forces in the form of “national conferences” to chart a new political future in Benin, Cape Verde Islands, Congo, Malawi, Mali, South Africa and Zambia. Benin’s nine-day “national conference” began on Feb 19, 1990, with 488 delegates, representing various political, religious, trade union, and other groups encompassing the broad spectrum of Beninois society.

The conference, whose chairman was Father Isidore de Souza, held “sovereign power” and its decisions were binding on all, including the government. It stripped President Matthieu Kerekou of power, scheduled multiparty elections that ended 17 years of autocratic Marxist rule.

In South Africa, the vehicle used to make that difficult but peaceful transition to a multiracial democratic society was the Convention for a Democratic South Africa. It began deliberations in July 1991, with 228 delegates drawn from about 25 political parties and various anti-apartheid groups. The de Klerk government made no effort to “control” the composition of CODESA. P

olitical parties were not excluded; not even ultra right-wing political groups, although they chose to boycott its deliberations. CODESA strove to reach a “working consensus” on an interim constitution and set a date for the March 1994 elections.

It established the composition of an interim or transitional government that would rule until the elections were held. More important, CODESA was “sovereign.” Its decisions were binding on the de Klerk government. De Klerk could not abrogate any decision made by CODESA — just as the African chief could not disregard any decision arrived at the village meeting.

Now, imagine a Convention for a Democratic Zimbabwe (CODEZI). In this case, leaders of all political parties in Zimbabwe, all churches, trade unions, teachers, professional bodies, student groups, etc. will be assembled to hammer out a new political future for the country –Zimbabweans solving their own problems.

If this process worked in Benin and South Africa, there is no reason why it shouldn’t work in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Zimbabwe and elsewhere in Africa.  Evidently, there is an African solution for the crisis in Zimbabwe but the leadership in southern Africa and Africa generally don’t see it.

Only a few, notably leaders in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zambia, have made feeble attempts to condemn the barbaric brutalities of the Mugabe regime. It is noteworthy that the strongest condemnation came from Liberia and Sierra Leone – countries that have been ravaged by civil wars of the same issue of power sharing.  

Even South Africa, whose president, Thabo Mbeki, was appointed by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to mediate the Zimbabwe crisis, failed miserably. After the March 29 elections, Mbeki claimed there was “no crisis” in Zimbabwe.

The rest of the African leadership is just not credible to condemn Mugabe when, as Africans would say, “they are doing the same thing in their own countries.” Who is President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda to urge Mugabe to step down? Back in 1986, the same President Museveni declared that “No African heads of state should be in power for more than 10 years.” He has been in power for 20 years and still counting.

It was worse than a farce when the grand daddy of all organizations – the African Union (AU) – met on Monday, June 30, in Egypt to find a solution to Zimbabwe’s crisis. Egypt happens to be a country, whose president, Hosni Mubarak, has been in power for more than 27 years.

Mugabe was invited to attend the Summit and, as was to be expected, he was greeted with hugs and hailed as a hero. The same thing happened in 1994. When Rwanda was about to implode the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) was on vacation, chomping on caviar and doing the watutsi in Addis Ababa.

Six years later, the OAU launched an inquiry into the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which blamed Western powers for failing to intervene to stop the mass slaughter. Naturally. And what did these leaders do to stop the slaughter occurring right under their own very noses? Nothing.

The paucity of good leadership has left a garish stain on the continent. More distressing, the caliber of leadership has deteriorated over the decades to execrable depths. The likes of Charles Taylor of Liberia and Sani Abacha of Nigeria even make Mobutu Sese Seko of formerly Zaire look like a saint. The slate of post colonial African leaders has been a disgusting assortment of military coconut-heads, quack revolutionaries, crocodile liberators, “Swiss bank” socialists, brief-case bandits, semi-illiterate brutes and vampire elites. Faithful only to their private bank accounts, kamikaze kleptocrats raid and plunder the treasury with little thought of the ramifications on national development

The U.N. or the international community is fecklessly impotent in doing anything about Zimbabwe. The U.S. is pushing the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions but Russia and China may veto or block it. Besides, the sanctions would only be symbolic and totally ineffective. The international community will watch haplessly until Zimbabwe implodes and then rush in relief supplies and peacekeepers – until another African country blows and the whole macabre ritual is repeated: DR Congo, Darfur, Somalia, etc.

It is most ironic that Robert Mugabe who fought against the illegal racist regime of Ian Smith of Rhodesia should end up himself presiding over an illegal regime in Zimbabwe.  Back in the 1970s, the most effective sanctions against the Smith regime were in telecommunications which cut the regime’s access to the rest of the world. In Zimbabwe’s case, African sanctions would prove more effective as it is a land-locked country. 

South Africa could cut electricity supplies to Zimbabwe with a flick of a switch and neighboring African states could seal their borders. But none of these is likely to happen. Nor would the Zimbabwe’s military generals bend to African sanctions.

Zimbabwe is finished, gone but that is not the end of the tragic saga. First, there are other African countries that are also standing in line:

 Angola: President Jose Eduardo has been in power since 1979;

  • Burkina Faso: President Blaise Compaore since 1987;
  • Cameroon: President Paul Biya since 1982
  • Chad: President Idriss Derby since 1994;
  • Egypt: President Hosni Mubarak since 1981;
  • Equatorial Guinea: Teodoro Obiang since 1979;
  • Gabon: Omar Bongo since 1967;
  • Guinea: President Lansana Conte since 1984;
  • Libya, Moammar Ghaddafi since 1969;

Second, Africa’s post-colonial story also shows that rebel leaders who seize power are often no better. They are themselves “crocodile liberators,” exhibiting the same dictatorial tendencies they loudly condemned in the despots they removed: Charles Taylor versus General Samuel Doe and Laurent Kabila versus Mobutu Sese Seko. As Africans often say: “We struggle very hard to remove one cockroach from power and the next rat comes to do the same thing.” Was Charles Taylor Better than Samuel Doe, and Laurent Kabila better than Mobutu Sese Seko?

If you think Robert Mugabe is bad wait till Emmerson Mnagagwa or Constantine Chiwenga takes over. 

The writer, a native of Ghana, is president of the Free Africa Foundation in Washington, D.C.He is the author of Africa Unchained (Palgrave/MacMillan).

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