Zanu PF succession process and practice (Part 1)
By Derek Matyszak
In order to consider how the succession to the presidency within ZANU PF might unfold, it is instructive to look at past successions to positions within the Presidium and factional battles.
The Fault Lines
Reports concerning those vying for the presidency are usually based upon conjecture and political gossip. The conventional wisdom in Zimbabwe is that there are two main factions within ZANU PF contending for the presidency on Mugabe’s departure, those who grouped around the late Solomon Mujuru and are now grouped around his wife Joice, and those grouped around Emmerson Mnangagwa.
However, it has also been suggested recently that those formerly aligned to Solomon Mujuru now rally around Sydney Sekeramayi as successor. Simultaneously, it has been claimed that the military secretly “symbolically swore in Emmerson Mnangagwa as shadow president” with the consent of President Mugabe.
Both the “Mujuru” and “Mnangagwa” factions have advanced differing and expedient perspectives on the manner in which the Presidium of ZANU PF is to be constituted to advance the cause of favoured candidates to the posts.
The blurring of the lines between ZANU PF as a party and the State has been a hallmark of Zimbabwe’s polity since 1980, and is reflected in the ZANU PF Party Constitution itself. One manifestation of this is the confluence of the Party Presidium and State Presidium. The State and ZANU PF Constitution both establish the posts of a president and two vice-presidents.
Those holding the posts under the State Constitution have always been the same individuals who hold the posts under the Party Constitution. With Mugabe having the unfettered discretion to appoint both Vice-Presidents under the State Constitution, this power affects the processes under the Party Constitution.
Combined with the fact that there is no unequivocal statement of term limits for the Presidium under the ZANU PF Constitution, a sector within ZANU PF, and particularly the Presidium itself, which of course includes Joice Mujuru, have advanced the notion that unless there is a “vacancy” in the Presidium, the nominations from the Provinces prior to Congress for the top three positions are a mere formality, in the same way as the People’s Conference is required yearly to declare the President of the Party as the ZANU PF candidate for State President.
Mugabe and his supporters have thus adopted the refrain that “there is no vacancy in the Presidium.” The notion that there need not be five yearly elections for the Presidency appears to have continued.
This assumption of the right to office by the incumbents has been disputed and contested by those seen as aligned to Emmerson Mnangagwa, who have contended that fresh elections to all posts within the Presidium must take place every five years by way of nominations from the Provinces. Their view is that these nominations are not merely a formal and automatic endorsement of the incumbents.
A second fault line dividing the Mujuru and Mnangagwa camps is a result of the Unity Accord which absorbed Joshua Nkomo’s PF ZAPU Party into ZANU PF in December 1987. One section of ZANU PF claims an unwritten term of the Unity Accord is that the four posts in the Presidium will be divided between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU, with ZANU PF holding the presidency and a vice-presidential post, and PF ZAPU holding the other vice-presidential position and the post of National Chairman.
Since the power base of PF ZAPU is in Matabeleland, the further inference by some is that the PF ZAPU posts will be held by members of the majority ethnic group in Matabeleland, the Ndebele.
However, many of those aligned to the Mnangagwa camp have taken the understanding concerning the distribution of posts within the Presidium along ethnic lines further, and maintained that it ought to be party policy that allmajor ethnic groups in Zimbabwe, the Zezuru, Manyika, Karanga, and Ndebele, will be represented in the Presidium.
The Military Factor
The ethnic analysis of ZANU PF’s succession battle views the contest as between the Zezuru (represented by the Mujuru faction) and the Karanga (represented by the Mnangagwa faction). Both are seen as periodically endeavouring to forge alliances with the Manyika and Ndebele groupings.
It certainly seems to be outside any coincidence that the Head of State, President Mugabe, a Vice-president (Mujuru), the head of the judiciary, Godfrey Chidyausiku, the head of the Defence Forces, Constantine Chiwenga, the Head of the Air Force, Perence Shiri, the head of the Police, Augustine Chihuri, and the Registrar-General of Elections are all Zezuru. None of the four Cabinet Ministers of the last government, excluded from the Politburo, were Zezuru.
Masvingo and Midlands Provinces, home to the Karanga, have consistently opposed nominations to the Presidium comprising people of Zezuru and Ndebele backgrounds only. The most contentious of the DCC elections took place in Masvingo and Manicaland, and those of the PEC in Masvingo, Midlands, Bulawayo and Manicaland.
However, while some factions within ZANU PF might wish to exploit ethnic considerations, several political observers have cautioned against using ethnicity as an analytical lens through which the internal dynamics of ZANU PF may be viewed.
For several years, and most obviously in the aftermath of Mugabe’s electoral defeat in March 2008 (when those heading the security sectors stepped in to ensure Mugabe’s “victory” in the presidential run-off election in June), it has been evident that the President and any aspirant to the presidency are heavily dependent upon support from the security sector.
ZANU PF succession politics may be conceptualised in terms of the extent to which the wooing of securocrats has been accepted or rebuffed, and the extent to which the securocrats believe who is best able to safeguard their positions and the status quo. This in turn infers the extent to which each of these are prepared to protect the positions of the ZANU PF old guard, most of whom, having played prominent roles in the “liberation war”, believe in “rule by entitlement” by virtue of their contributions made during the war.
Early Manoeuvring and Precedent
After the Congress of 1964, ZANU PF, due to internal repression and then the war, was unable to hold any Congresses for the next 20 years. Leadership issues were determined by the party’s council or “Dare” in exile with significant influence exerted by the military, manifested famously in the Mgagao Declaration which led to the ousting of the then leader of the party, Ndabaningi Sithole.
The Congress of 1984 revealed a party struggling to adjust to constitutionalism as a modusoperandi.With the Politburo at this time being elected rather than appointed from the Central Committee by the party President, as is now the case, it was apparent as the delegates converged at Borrowdale race course that at least six seasoned party stalwarts were set to be deposed from their positions in the Politburo. Amongst these were Simon Muzenda and Kumbirai Kangai, who had not been nominated by the provinces.
They were rescued by the intervention of Mugabe who went so far as to persuade Maurice Nyagumbo, the nominee of all provinces, to stand aside and allow Muzenda to fill the vacant Vice-presidency post. Although Mugabe’s preferences held sway, the revised list of candidates was met with booing by the plenary of delegates. Congress had just experienced its first taste of guided democracy, which was to emerge each time a vacancy arose in the Presidium.
From the time the executive presidency was created, and the Unity Accord signed in 1987, there was little challenge to the triumvirate of Robert Mugabe as President, and Joshua Nkomo and Simon Muzenda as Vice-Presidents. The only position which admitted any fluidity was that of National Chairman, a possible future stepping stone to the vice-presidency on the demise of any one of the two vice-presidents.
Positioning and manoeuvring around the issue of succession to President Mugabe began as early as 1999, when sectors within ZANU PF were, correctly as it transpired, beginning to view President Mugabe as an electoral liability.
The Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions first locked horns following the death, on the 1st July of that year, of Joshua Nkomo, then the PF ZAPU nominated Vice President. Pursuant to what one PF ZAPU member has described as a series of “secret meetings”, the National Party Chairman, Joseph Msika was “elected” as the new Vice-President by the Congress that convened in December 1999.
Although a member of PF ZAPU, and raised in Matabeleland, Joseph Msika was Zezuru, the same ethnic group as President Mugabe. This caused disgruntlement within PF ZAPU among those who felt that Msika had been imposed from above, and, not being Ndebele, was not an appropriate representative of the Matabeleland Provinces.
However, being fourth in the Presidium hierarchy, and previously second in command to Joshua Nkomo within ZAPU, his elevation to the Vice-Presidency was not overtly contentious. Significantly, however, Mugabe was unable to secure the elevation of his preferred candidate, Thenjiwe Lesabe, the then head of the Women’s League.
The promotion of Joseph Msika to the Vice-Presidency left the position of National Chairperson open, and Mnangagwa threw his hat into the ring for this position. Had he succeeded in this quest, he would have been in pole position to succeed Vice-President Simon Muzenda, also a Karanga, and within reach of the Presidency after Mugabe’s departure.
It was apparently astute political manoeuvring by Solomon Mujuru, however, that secured the nomination of John Nkomo, an Ndebele, from eight of the ten provinces. As an Ndebele, Nkomo was an unlikely rival to Solomon Mujuru’s choice for the vice-presidency when the opportunity arose – as it did with the death of Simon Muzenda in September 2003.
The Tsholotsho Saga
With the vacancy now occurring in the ZANU PF wing of the Vice-Presidency, the appointment of the replacement was never going to be smooth. Mugabe and ZANU PF were, however, seemingly content to await the ZANU PF Congress of December 2004 before filling the vacancy. A bruising battle took place between the Mujuru and Mnangagwa camps in the intervening period, from which the Mujuru camp emerged the stronger.
Before then, the grouping around Mnangagwa appears to have been in the ascendency in the Provinces for several years prior to Simon Muzenda’s death, and seemed likely to be able to muster the support for nomination from the required six Provinces for the Vice-Presidency.
To further Mnangagwa’s chances, his supporters sought to advance the principles expounded in what became known as the “Tsholotsho Declaration”. Jonathan Moyo, a prominent turncoat politician, was a key player in the drama which unfolded. He has written in detail about the events.
In his account, Moyo maintains that the Tsholotsho Declaration is made up of four principles:
That all the country’s four major ethnic groups, Karanga, Manyika, Zezuru and Ndebele should be represented in the Presidium;
that the position of president should not be monopolised by one ethnic group but rotate among the four major ethnic groupings;
that the filling of positions in the Presidium should not be by imposition by the Party hierarchy but through democratic elections done by secret balloting; and
such positions must be filled in accordance with the Party Constitution.
Since the Mujuru aspirant to the position, Joice Mujuru is Zezuru, already represented in the Presidium by President Mugabe, support for the Declaration was seen as support for Mnangagwa as Vice-President. Those supporting these principles envisaged a Presidium with Mugabe, a Zezuru, as President, Mnangagwa, a Karanga, as one Vice-President with an Ndebele co-Vice President, and “young Turk” and legal advisor to ZANU PF, Patrick Chinamasa (Manyika), as National Chairman.
The Declaration threw down the gauntlet to those who believed that the top three positions in the Presidency were inviolable until a vacancy occurred (other than through an expiry of a term of office), and that two of the top four positions should be occupied by former PF ZAPU members. Among them was Mugabe who did not intend to be hampered by the inconvenience that there was nothing in the ZANU PF Constitution which supported his views.
After a series of meetings in August, 2003, headed by provincial chairmen and provincial governors, presided over by the national political commissar, it was clear that Mnangagwa had the support for the vice-presidency from all except three Provinces – Mashonaland Central, Harare, and Mashonaland East.
The Mujuru alignment, which included elements from the three disaffected Provinces, came together shortly after these meetings began. A strategy was devised whereby a sudden sensitivity to gender issues was to be used to undermine the Mnangagwa group. The Mujuru camp thus latched upon a resolution, first put forward by the Women’s League at its August 1999 meeting in Victoria Falls, that one of the four members of the Presidium must be a woman.
Ironically, given subsequent events and that she is now regarded as being very firmly on the Mnangagwa side of the fence, Oppah Muchinguri as Deputy Secretary of the Women’s League, reportedly played a key role in driving the proposal. The Women’s League was prevailed upon to repeat its demand at its plenary meeting of 2nd September 2004. Accompanied by his wife Grace, Mugabe attended the meeting and announced that he supported this demand.
The Mnangagwa faction was unimpressed. The date for nominations to the posts in the Presidium from the Provinces was set for the 21st November, 2004. Under the cover of an invitation as guest of honour at Dinyane High School for a prize giving ceremony, Mnangagwa prepared to go to Tsholotsho on the 18th November, 2004, where, not coincidently, Chairmen of the Provinces would be present to hear his speech.
The Tsholotsho meeting could not be seen as anything other than a direct challenge to Mugabe’s authority. It was clear that President Mugabe’s intention was that the vacancy left by Simon Muzenda’s death was to be filled by Joice Mujuru. The Tsholotsho gathering appeared to be intended to counter this by advancing the Tsholotsho principles.
Mugabe called an emergency Politburo meeting for the same day, the 18th November, 2004. The result of the meeting was that the Politburo declared that it had “amended” the Party Constitution to include the demand of the Women’s League that one of the Vice Presidents be a woman.
Less widely publicised, but of even more significance, was the amendment providing that the Provincial Electoral Colleges would no longer be the 44-member Provincial Executive Councils, but the much larger Provincial Co-ordinating Committees.
The election would thus be conducted under the watchful eye of the Central Committee members from the Province, some of whom would undoubtedly be Politburo members who had agreed to the amendment. The latter amendment was clearly designed to neutralise the Mnangagwa faction’s control over the Provincial Executive Councils in seven Provinces.
Perversely, Emmerson Mnangagwa, as Secretary for Legal Affairs, was given the task of drafting the necessary amendments to the ZANU PF Constitution. This required the alteration of only a few words, but, perhaps deciding that discretion was the better part of valour, Mnangagwa pleaded this commitment to stay well away from the meeting in Tsholotsho.
As ZANU PF Secretary for Administration in the Politburo, and, in what was to be one of his last few acts as such, he was also given the task of writing to the Provinces to explain the new nomination procedure. Aware that the knives were being sharpened in Harare, and with Mnangagwa literally, and metaphorically, distancing himself from events, most of those meeting in Tsholotsho made a belated and feeble attempt to be seen as compliant with Mugabe’s wishes.
Purporting to obey the directive that resulted from the Politburo meeting earlier in the day, and hoping for some success in repeating Mugabe’s preference at the 1999 Congress, they changed their original line up for the Presidium to the extent only that Thenjiwe Lesabe, an Ndebele woman, be a second vice-president.
This proposal was still unprecedented. It would require the removal of an incumbent, Joseph Msika, from the vice-presidency. The directive from the Politburo – and thus from Mugabe – had made it clear that nominations from the Provinces were expected only with regard to the single vacant post of vice-president.
The Women’s League duly met on the 22nd November, 2004, and formally declared Joice Mujuru to be their choice as the woman to succeed Simon Muzenda, in accordance with the instruction from the Politburo. The direction of the wind was clear. Six out of the ten provinces thereafter duly nominated Mujuru as their candidate.
And on the 6th December, Congress “elected” Mujuru as Vice President. President Mugabe, apparently euphoric at his successful exercise of political muscle, imprudently stated to the gathering: “When you choose her as a Vice President, you don’t want her to remain in that chair do you?” Given what had transpired, the suggestion that Mujuru had been “chosen” by Congress was hardly accurate.
Mugabe moved swiftly against those who had sought to defy his choice of anointed appointee. The Tuesday before the weekend Congress, the Politburo “suspended” the six Provincial Chairmen and Jabulani Sibanda, head of the Zimbabwe War Veterans Association, who had been present in Tsholotsho. It was the first of several axings.
On the 17th December, 2004, Mugabe announced a new and expanded Politburo of 51 members. Jonathan Moyo was removed from the Politburo (and subsequently the Party, and also as Minister of Information).
Mnangagwa was deposed as Secretary for Administration – effectively the Party’s Secretary General and fifth in the Party hierarchy – and replaced by Didymus Mutasa. He was given the post of secretary for legal affairs (12th in the Politburo hierarchy) displacing Patrick Chinamasa who was to deputise him thereby becoming a junior member without voting rights.
The President explained the measures as follows:
Those who weres uspended will remain suspended and will be disciplined by the national chairman, while their vacancies will be filled in the future…There is everything wrong when chairpersons of the Party go and meet secretly without the knowledge of the leadership of the Party, and worse still, what would they be discussing there?
There is no party run like that….When the war was fought, we fought as one on all fronts. We didn’t ask guerrillas where they came from, asivana Mafikizolo ndovaakuti uyu anobva kwakati? Uyu anobva kwakati? (but the newcomers would ask ―you come from where? you come from where?) and so on. They should know we are non-tribalists and non-regionalists.
The earlier caveat that this narrative of events is drawn largely from the account of Jonathan Moyo is worth repeating. The Mujuru camp certainly had a different view of events. Far from seeing the proposal, that one a vice-president be a woman, as being a “sudden” sensitivity to gender issues, they pointed to the fact that the proposal had been made ahead of the Congress in 1999 and that they had gone to the extent of threatening to boycott that Congress if their demand was not met.
Having seemingly belatedly achieved their objective ahead of the 2004 Congress, intensive lobbying then took place to ensure that Joice Mujuru assumed this reserved post, which would be confirmed as such at the 2004 Congress.
The elevation of Mujuru thus merely required formal endorsement at Congress and was not a late and hastily conceived ploy to undermine the Tsholotsho plotters. Indeed the contrary is advanced as the case – the Tsholotsho Declaration was a ploy to undermine Mujuru’s almost certain ascendency and compelled the precipitate change to the party constitution.
The Tsholotsho saga continues to reverberate through ZANU PF’s succession and internal politics. Several issues arising from the saga require comment for present purposes.
The Dissolution of the DCCs
The disbanding of the DCCs may also be viewed as part of the Tsholotsho leitmotif. Several analysts have suggested that the dissolution was at the instigation of the Mujuru faction, who once again used the ruse of a constitutional amendment to undermine the Mnangagwa faction, whose supporters had won the majority of places on these committees.
The Power of the Politburo
Although ZANU PF has been structured in a manner which allows the choice of successors to the Presidium to be extremely democratic, the actual process is best described as “guided democracy” with President Mugabe at the tiller and the Politburo as the crew. The Politburo had no power to amend the ZANU PF Constitution to mandate a female vice-president or to change the composition of the Provincial Electoral Colleges.
That power lies with the Central Committee (subject to ratification by Congress) and the Congress itself. The Congress nonetheless ratified the changes which had been unlawfully made by the Politburo to accord with Mugabe’s intentions and strategy. The Politburo also had no power to suspend the Provincial Chairpersons, and the National Chairman no power to discipline them.
In the role of implementer of the President’s policies, using procedures often outside the confines of the Party Constitution, the Politburo has become enormously powerful since Tsholotsho. Rather than the Congress controlling the Central Committee, the Central Committee controlling the Politburo and the Politburo directing the Presidium, the flow of power is in precisely the opposite direction.
ZANU PF spokesman, Rugare Gumbo, has candidly stated that ―The politburo is the policy-making body outside congress. The Politburo thus has arrogated a number of powers to itself:
to remove and replace provincial chairmen; dismiss members of PCC;
to reject nominees to the Central Committee by the PCCs;
bar individuals from contesting for the post of Provincial Chairperson;
cancel polls of Party structures;
Derek Matyszak is a Senior Researcher at the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU).
This is the first part of an abridged version of the recent report produced for the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum by the Research and Advocacy Unit [RAU] entitled ‘The Mortal Remains: Succession and The Zanu PF Body Politic’.
